OR, A

VINDICATION

Of the Common
Doctrine of Proteſtant DIVINES,
Concerning

Predetermination:

(*i. e.*
The Intereſt of God as the firſt Cauſe,
in all the Actions, as ſuch, of all Rational Creatures:)
From the invidious Conſequences,
with which it is burdened by

Mr. *JOHN HOWE*,

In a late Letter and Poſtſcript, of
GOD'S PRESCIENCE.

By *T. D.*

LONDON,

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To the Reverend Mr. *JOHN HOWE*, Author of the late Letter and Poſtſcript of *God's Preſcience.*

SIR,

WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honourable Mr. Boyle, and thereby underſtood its deſign, and withal obſerved the ſmallneſs of the Bulk, I promiſed my ſelf that it would be Pagella, hoc ſolo nomine redarguenda, quod ſit tota Gemmea. For elſe I thought it would not be worthy of ſo great a Mœcenas, a Maſter of all ſort of Learning; and [ſo] whoſe nobility is not only in Parchment, (as Charron ſpeaks): nor of the Author, (for I was aware of him, though he had concealed his name) whoſe parts I well knew (and have always had the candor upon all fit occaſions to acknowledge) were not of the lower ſize: nor yet of ſo excellent a ſubject, and ſo needful in theſe dregs of time, which verge ſo much toward Socinianiſm. And in the peruſal of the Letter it ſelf, for ſome time I pleaſed my ſelf with an apprehenſion that I had not impoſed upon my ſelf; nor had my affection to the Author ſeduced my judgment. Fancy and Reaſon were in ſo happy a

conjunction, that I hoped they would never parted thoroughout the whole Discourse. But alas! too soon I found my hopes shamefully baffled. For (beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4. 28. pag. 28. which I could not digest, and divers passages in the process of your after-Discourse not unexceptionable) from pag. 32, to 50, to speak my sense freely, I found pro thesauro carbones, i.e. Coals instead of Treasure, shining indeed, but black and smutty; politeness of stile, I mean, continued, but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dissevered; jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense; old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode, and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours; and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use, and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames; and sometimes degenerate eloquence, which (like painted glass) though it was an ornament, yet impeded the transmission of the light: and (which is worst of all) the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny, that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin; which I must needs profess was a strange surprisal to me; and so much the more, because I could not conceive what should induce you a Protestant Divine, to make affidavit of a Pontifical accusation, nor why in this Discourse. For if the end you assigned your self in doing

was the vindication of the blessed God from the imputation of being the cause of moral evil, *you have certainly* lurcht *the Reader of his expectation, by offering nothing toward it but what he can easily see through, (viz.) that God is not the* cause [*universally*] *of* natural good; *or at least as remote as the Grand-father is of the Grand-child.* [*See your own words,* Let. p. 36.] *Two causes which might seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse, your self has removed out of your Readers way. It was not the request of the Honourable Person to whom your Letter is directed, but (for ought I can collect)* as the defending God's Predeterminative concourse unto sinful actions was an unenjoined task, *Let.* p. 150. *So was the overthrowing it too. Nor was it the connexion between Prescience and Predetermination (as it lies in the Divine Decree, and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Prescience)* for that was not your design to demonstrate Gods Prescience of all whatsoever futurities, and consequently of the sins of men; but supposing it to shew its reconcileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree, *(as you since tell us)* Postsc. p. 4. *which I did easily apprehend before. For all the* mediums *you use for the eviction of this reconcileableness, borrow no strength from the denial of* Predetermination. *Sometime after your Letter succeeded a Postscript, in the which I was more astonished than before* of-

scrupuli steterintque comæ. *For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better, they proved a great deal worse. I had such an opinion of your modesty, that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to sinful actions*, Thin Sophistry, Collusive ambiguity, *Let. p.* 41. Vain attempts, 38. Dismal conclusions, 36. the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once, *p.* 39, 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth, *p.* 50. *And that reflexion you make upon those* who have used the distinction of *voluntas signi & Beneplaciti*, that they have only rather concealed a good meaning, than expressed by it a bad one, *p.* 106. *For take all together, and I see not that they amount to a less guilt, than of trampling upon that venerable dust, which was sometimes animated by truly Heroick Souls, and bore the names of* Zuinglius, Calvin, Beza, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twisse, Ames, *&c. than which no cause hath had, nor needs greater Patrons. But instead of recalling, you have avowed them, by the addition of others of the same sort*, a contagion, a deadly thing, *Postsc. p.* 15. An ill coloured opinion, *Postsc. p.* 51. Fearful consequences of that rejected opinion,

opinion; vanity of the ſubterfuges where-by its aſſertors think to hide the malig-nity of it, *p.* 50. *Nor was this enough, but as if you were* Animal gloriæ, *(as was ſaid of the Philoſophers) an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applauſe, and thought your ſelf another* Goliah, *you cry out,* I de-fie the armies of Iſrael this day; give me a man that we may fight together. *What other interpretation are theſe words capable of?* Now I perceive that ſome perſons, who had formerly entertained that ſtrange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concur-rence to the wickedeſt actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been offen-ded with that Letter, for not expreſſing more reſpect unto it; and yet offered nothing themſelves (which to me ſeems ex-ceeding ſtrange) for the ſolving of that great difficulty and incumbrance, which it infers upon our Religion, *Poſtſc. p.* 7. *Or theſe*, If I find my ſelf obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to ſpend in this world can never be ſpent to better pur-poſe, than in diſcovering, *&c.* the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it, *p.* 50. *but moſt immodeſt is your threatning thoſe that* aſſert the contradictory to your Pro-poſition, *with* your preparations for the defence of it, *and plain intimation of the value you put upon them, as ſufficient to ſi-*

lence all opposers, p. 51, 52. *And for ought I can judg to the contrary, if contempt of your Antagonists will dash them out of countenance, and so silence them, you are likely enough to obtain the victory you assure your self beforehand. An instance whereof you have given us in your ill treatment of* Mr. Gale, *a most pious, modest, and learned man, and our common friend, and one who like a friend touched your sore so gently, that one would have thought you should hardly have cried Oh! much less have cried out of* Vindictive Hostility, *p.* 16. *and that he was the man that might be instanced in, that had* managed a publick contest with that candour and fairness, as not at all to intrench upon friendship, which you did well know was possible *to be done, (as you express your self,* ibid.) *And yet how many holes do you pick in his coat? one while you insinuate that he* is of those mens humours who take an unaccountable pleasure, in depraving what is done by others, *p.* 12. *whereas I who have known him about* 25 *years, and was of the same Academical Society with you both, have never observed any such misbehaviour of his. Another while, that he had* a concealed end of his own glory, *viz.* [*in attacking you*], (*as if the good man had coveted that inscription upon his Tombstone,*——Magnis tamen excidit ausis). *And again, assert*

that

that he had a mighty ſtrong and irreſiſtible inclination to ſquabble a little with your Letter, *p.* 13. *And that* this inclination cannot but owe it ſelf to ſome peculiar aſpect and reference he had to the Author, *p.* 14. *(whereas I dare be his voucher, that all the harm he wiſhes you is but an increaſe of humility). And this guilt you make account is faſtened upon him, becauſe he hath not attempted ſundry others of former and latter days, which have ſaid much to the purpoſe which your Letter does but touch on the by,* p. 13. *which is a ſtrange accuſation, and will appear ſuch to thoſe who ſhall upon peruſal find, that he hath run the hazard of his* ſafety in medling with thoſe Giants *you point at,* Poſtſc. p. 14. *But if he had not, I think he might apologize for himſelf, that your tract being conciſe, and adorned with good language, might invite more buyers and readers. Ratsbane capt in fine ſugar, may well be judged likely to entice ſome liquoriſh appetite to taſte of it, to their own hurt. But the greateſt provocation not to let you [whoever be let] paſs, is that intolerable reflection upon the Aſſerters of Predetermination; upon their Arguments, and the natural conſequences of them, all at once in theſe words.* But the effects of a Sophiſtical wit againſt ſenſe, and more againſt the ſenſe of our ſouls, and moſt of all againſt the entire ſum and ſubſtance of all Morality

and

and Religion at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of braſs with ſtraws and feathers, *Let. p.* 39, 40. *This paſſage alone were enough to raiſe indignation, ſufficient to make a diſputant (at leaſt if that paſſion be as effectual to that purpoſe as the old ſhred,* —— facit indignatio verſum, *intimates it is to make a Poet). And this was it that made me inquiſitive after an anſwer to your Letter, and Poſtſcript, as to which, when after many rumours of Anſwers preparing, I found my hopes fruſtrated, I reſolved (though almoſt too late) to attempt one my ſelf, for my reſolution was his in* Terence, a quoquam alio quam a me, a me autem potius quam a nemine; *that I had rather your anſwer ſhould come from any one than me, but from me rather than no body. I met with many diſcouragements in the laſt clauſe of my reſolution, in general from a conſciouſneſs of my own diſabilities, and particularly from the hard meaſure your other Antagoniſt* Mr. Gale *hath met with, as in the inſtances above-mentioned, ſo in ſome other. The one, your carping at words, that you make ſo ſevere Animadverſion upon him for an innocent Pleonaſm, The* Divine Independent will of God, *which meant you no harm, nor was more* guilty of any deſign *to rob your Eſſay of any part of its eloquence, than that was to* pilfer from him any part of his collections, *Poſtſc. p.* 13.

And

And I was not without ſome apprehenſions that I might fall under your laſh my ſelf, who am not curious in the choice of words, or compoſure of periods. But againſt this fear I was ſomewhat relieved, as againſt the ſorrow I had conceived for Mr. Gales *affront, (as if it had fell out for that end, and alſo to juſtifie the old ſaw,* aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus *) by an happy accident that I have taken you tardy twice in that kind your ſelf: For what elſe but a Pleonaſm is that Phraſe,* The rectitude of Gods holy nature, *Let. p.* 42. *and* the rectitude of Gods own moſt holy will and way, *p* 59. *in the exceſs of your caution, leſt any ſhould think the holy nature, the moſt holy will and way of God were void of rectitude,* Poſtſc. p. 22. *And elſewhere* actions malignantly wicked, *p.* 32. *i. e.* wickedly wicked. *But theſe are childiſh criminations, unfit to be bandied from hand to hand by ſober perſons. The other diſcouragement was the difficult inveſtigation of your ſenſe, which I take to be a far harder task than to confute it; of which, that I may not be thought to complain without cauſe, I have collected ſome inſtances of repugnant and ſelf-contradicting Propoſitions, in your Diſcourſes.*

1. *Mediate concurrence.*

1. It sufficiently salves the rights of the first cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it, which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent creatures may use or not use as they please, *Let. p.* 36.

2. *All actions good to* Mr. Gales *Quest.* Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? *you Answ.* True, *Postsc. p.* 36.

3. *Predetermination denied as to some actions,* (viz.) *evil.*

This is the design of all your Letter, from p. 32. *to* 50. *and of the Postscript.*

2. *Immediate concurrence.*

1. I do really believe Gods immediate concourse to all the actions of his creatures, *Post. p.* 28.

2. *Some actions in themselves evil.*

Some actions of the creatures are in themselves most malignantly wicked, *Le. p.* 32. *and* intrinsecally evil, *p.* 46.

3. *Predetermination to all actions granted.*

The active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not meerly in giving them natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, *Postsc. p.* 39. *n.* 5.

By which last clause, a real influence upon those powers, *if you mean* (*as I cannot divine*

divine what elſe you can) *a* reducing thoſe powers into act, (*as your phraſe is*, Ib. n. 6.) *you come over to our Camp, and we will give good entertainment to ſo ſerviceable a Deſerter.*

4. *Predetermination forces the will.*

Nothing is more apparently a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility than not to do an action whereto the Agent is determined by an infinite power, *Let. p.* 33.

4. *Predetermination forces not the Will.*

It is unreaſonable to imagine that God cannot in any caſe determine the will of a rational creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, *Let. p.* 141.

Men are inabled by an internal infuſion of power and vital influence to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it, *p.* 145.

non eſt ingenii mei hoſce nodos diſſolvere, *i.e.* I have not wit enough to untie theſe knots. *The conſideration of theſe repugnancies, fills me with wonder at your exclamation againſt* Mr. Gale, *for finding no fault with your Pamphlet but what he makes,* Poſtſc. p. 11. *and particularly for ſuggeſting*

that

that your opinion falls in with the sentiments of *Durandus*, which many think not well of, *Postsc.* p. 9. *For I must needs profess, that as far as I can judg, he hath but slandered you with a word of truth. For in your Letter, by which* Mr. Gale *did, and only could take his measures of your sense, there's not the most implicite intimation of any other intendment, than to close with* Durandus. *And though you do explicitely disown it in your Postsc. yet you instruct not your Reader, how the Grammatical construction of these words above cited,* p. 36. *of your* Let. *will yield any other meaning, than what* Mr. Gale *pitches upon. And the foresight of the probability of being cried out upon for want of candour, in the same respects, did not a little deter me from the undertakement.*

A third, the necessity of making a Parallel between your and the Papists Arguments against Predetermination, which I foresaw would give you occasion to fault me, (as you do Mr. Gale*), for parallelling your conceptions with theirs, the reason whereof must needs be because I take a Papist for an ill-favoured name,* Postsc. p. 27. *yet here they are.*

1. Some

1. Some actions are intrinsecally evil, and in themselves wicked, *Let. p.* 33, 32.

2. God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as the best, *Post. p.* 25. [*viz.* by the Doctrine of Predetermination of sinful actions.]

3. For God to determine men to the worst of actions, can mean no less thing than to impel them to do them, *Let. p.* 37. *which* impelling *you call* an ineluctable fate, *p.* 33. [*and so intend* compelling.]

4. God hath more influence and concurrence to the worst actions than the sinner or tempter, *Post. pag.* 25. and in more words, *Let. pag.* 32. [viz. *by our Doctrine.*]

1. There are many actions so intrinsecally and in themselves evil, that they always are repugnant to the eternal Law, and Right Reason. *Bell. de Am. c.* 18.

2. *Calvin* was blasphemous against God in affirming, That God works evil works in us, so as he works good, *Alvarez de Aux. Gr. l.* 4.

3. God, according to our Adversaries opinion [*viz. the Protestants*] impells men, and so compells them to sin, *Bell. c.* 5.

4. God according to the opinion of *Calvin* and *Beza* is the primary Author of all sins. *Bell. c.* 4. *de Amiss. Gr.*

But

But pass upon this parallel what judgment you please, I am at a point. I have proposed to my self a good end in the exhibition of it, viz. *to mind my Readers that the point under debate between you and me is a stated controversie between the Papists and Protestants, and therefore the affirmative not lightly to be receded from; and in drawing it up I gave my self a little pleasure mixed with disdain;* that because there was no Smith found throughout all the land of Israel, you were fain to go down to the Philistines to sharpen your axe and your mattock, 1 *Sam.* 13. 19, 20. *And I admired that you could not excogitate one new Argument, but present us with all old, and strangely unfortunate, which have been baffled as often as urged. I have intitled my Answer* De Causa Dei, *rather than* De causa Deo; *which latter might be proper enough for the subject, a Defence of Gods interest as the first cause in all the actions of his Creatures. But herein I have imitated* Bradwardine's Piety, *who would signifie thereby that it was the Cause of God he designed to secure from the impetuous assaults of its Adversaries, among whom I am heartily sorry you should be numbred, as to this instance. I know you will not own the charge, but pretend that you are on Gods side, but if so, you have neglected an opportunity of shewing your self, by* not reconciling Gods preventive methods of sin *with immediate con-*

course

course, which is at least as hard as with Predeterminative concourse: *and to be sure,* any one may see it was very idle and ludicrous trifling, to offer at reconciling those methods with God's Prescience, and to wave that (manifestly) greater difficulty of reconciling *them with his immediate concourse,* if you think there is such a thing, *(to use your own words with but the variation that a different instance requires)* Postsc. pag. 3, 4. *I have been as brief as I could in my Answer, without prejudice to our cause; and have come (as* Cæsar Borgia *said of the* French *in their Expedition into* Italy) *rather with Chalk in my hands to mark out the Inns, than with Arms to break through and take possession. It will be time enough to arm when* your Preparations shall rise out of that dust and silence in which they are buried, *Post.* p. 51. *In the mean time I have but pointed out the* Fontes solutionum, *the general grounds upon which our Answers depend, to all Arguments that can be produced. To conclude, I could heartily wish you would seriously reflect upon your Letter and Postscript, and consider how many passages you are obliged to repent of and retract. Shall I mind you of that notable saying of* Austin, Illius scripta summa authoritate digniſſima, &c. *i.e.* his writings deserve to be of the greatest authority, who hath let slip never a word, not that he would, but that he ought to recall. He that hath

not attained so much wisdom as to be able to say nothing not to be repented of, may yet attain so much modesty as to repent of what he knows he has said amiss, *Aug. Ep.* 17. *And for your encouragement, it may not be unseasonable to mind you, of what you cannot but know, that* Austin *who gave this good counsel, did take it himself, and left upon record retractation of his Errors, wherein he was a singular instance of humility, and was rewarded by God with a greater esteem in the Church than any one man since his time. Which is all, besides that I am*

Your true
Friend and Brother
T. D.

Octob. 31. 1677.

De

De Cauſa Dei.

IT has been always judged very needful in Polemicks to ſtate the Queſtion, and explain the terms, when they labour under any ambiguity, or however fall not under the apprehenſion of thoſe who are to be inſtructed, for want of skill in that art or ſcience to which they belong, or language from which they are borrowed. In neither of theſe reſpects will it be needleſs in the Controverſie now to be agitated; not as to the firſt, becauſe Mr. *Howe* gives us his ſenſe in various terms, and ſuch as ſeem repugnant to each other: one while that which he denies is, a *Predeterminative concurrence* to all actions of the Creatures, *Let. p.* 32. and *Poſtſc. p.* 3. and *Predeterminative concourſe*, Poſt. p. 19. another while 'tis *Predetermining Influence*, Poſt. p. 19. and a *Determinative influence*, Let. p. 36. and *Efficacious influence*, Poſt. p. 52. As for the two former phraſes (which are of the ſame import) they are in effect *contradictio in adjecto* in their conjunction. I appeal to *Strangius*, Mr. *H.*'s friend, but my Adverſary in the main Queſtion under conſideration, *Hujuſ-*

modi Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum prævium appellant, &c. *i. e.* Some confound this kind of *Predetermination* with the *general concourse* of God. But they speak very improperly who call *Predetermination* a *previous* [or *Predeterminative*] *concourse*, or say that God does by concourse determine second causes: and he quotes *Twisse* with approbation, saying, *Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo*, &c. i.e. *To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect, is not to determine that agent. For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect, and yet it does not determine God: therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act.* Strang. de Vol. Dei, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. *Strangius* does not call the terms a *contradiction*, I confess, but the reason out of *Twisse* gave him as just ground (as it does me) to so call them. As for the latter phrase, *influence*, which he makes equipollent with the former *concourse*, in these words, *I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms as some do*, Post. p. 29. *I* had rather he should hear *Strangius* again, than me blaming his not affecting that curiosity of distinction: *Cæterum nobis operæpretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo vocabula concursum & influxum*, &c. i.e. *But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between*

those

those two words Concourse *and* Influence, *which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded. For first, Influence is of a larger extent than Concourse. For the causality of every Cause, especially the Efficient, is called Influence. And therefore in many instances there may be observed an Influence of God, when yet there is no concourse, as when he acts, not making use of any second cause. Again, although in the concourse of two Causes each of them are considered as having their Influence, yet the word Influence is absolute, and noting a respect to another cause; but the word Concourse is relative to another cause.* Strang. de Vol. Dei l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term *Efficacious*, it suits us well enough, if Mr. *H.* intends by it an Infallibility of the event, or the certain production of those actions which God hath an Influence upon. The ambiguity of Mr. *H.* phrases removed, and the sense of them brought to a certainty, I assert the contradictory to his Proposition, *That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those that are most wicked,* Post. p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms, we would thus lay down, That God does determine, or predetermine, or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions. *Strangius* fairly enough cites our Thesis, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 155. The Que-

ſtion then to be diſcuſſed is, Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions? So *Strang.* fairly, *l.* 2 *c.* 4 *p.* 155. Unleſs it may ſeem meet to add that *reduplicative particle, as ſuch*, becauſe of Mr. *Howe*'s addition, *even thoſe that are moſt wicked*, Poſt. p. 52. As to which it is to be noted, that we who aſſert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures, do limit it to the actions conſidered abſtractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them: as for inſtance, we hold Gods Predetermination of the natural act whereby *David* begat a child in Adultery, as well as of thoſe whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony; and of the uſe of his tongue in telling a lie to *Abimelech* the Prieſt, as well as in praiſing God. Whereas Mr. *Howe* limits Gods *Predetermination only to morally* [*or ſpiritually*] *good actions, as ſuch*, Poſt. p. 39. n. 6. Which *Predetermination ſpecial*, we grant; but withal aſſert a *general*, which extends to evil actions. In which we conſider,

1. *The ſubject*; and as to this we ſay that ſin is in that which is good, the nature of man and his faculties and actions, and theſe God excites and guides efficacioully. And this *ſubject* is called the *materiale* or ſubſtrate matter of ſin.

2. *The end*; and thus though not the nature,

ture, yet the existence of sin is good, or it is good that sin should be, because God draws good out of it; and hence God predetermines to the natural actions, though he knows sin will adhere to them. The grand term then to be explained is *Predetermination*, or (as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it) *Præcurse* and *Præmotion*, of which terms the former which signifies a *fore-appointment*, is either from eternity, or in time. The latter two, only in time. The former (*viz.*) Predetermination, is either from *eternity*, and so is an immanent act of Gods, that is, of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures; or in *time*, which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce. And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood; and this act of Gods is called *Predetermination*, because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that; and 'tis called a *Precourse*, or *Premotion*, i. e. a *running before*, or *fore motion*, (as I may so speak), because in order of nature it is before the action of the creature. Again, *Predetermination* [or *Precourse*, or *Premotion*], is distinguished into *Physical* or *Moral*. The latter, I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such, but not with respect to evil actions, unless the proposing objects

and occaſions of ſin may (as ſome learned men judg) be reduced to the actions of a moral cauſe. But whether the moral acts of God in commanding, threatning, promiſing, &c. may be juſtly denominated Predetermination, will remain dubitable till another doubt be reſolved, (*viz.*) Whether the will do always follow the laſt practical dictate of the underſtanding. Againſt the affirmative of which Queſtion (to note that *obiter*) the moſt acute and learned *Wallis* ſeems to oppoſe an irrefragable Argument, *viz. that the Will then is not diſabled by the fall more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven.* Wallis *Truth tried againſt the Lord* Brook, *p.* 55. But let *Predetermination Moral* fall or ſtand, our Queſtion is not of that, but of *Phyſical Predetermination*, as appears in that we make it common to all creatures, ſome whereof are not capable of a *Moral Predetermination*, (ſuppoſing that to be) which yet is not intended to be agitated at preſent, but only that which is exerciſed about free agents, that is, rational creatures. Which that it may be done with more clearneſs, and may in part obviate ſome of our learned Antagoniſt's objections, we ſhall endeavour, with as much accuracy as is needful to a diſcourſe that will fall into other than learned mens hands, to conſider

consider *Predetermination* as contradistinguished, or opposed rather to two things, which are acknowledged by him as Gods Acts respecting the actions of free agents, (not excluding natural), (*viz.*) *Conservation* and *immediate Concourse*, or *Concurrence*; the concession of the former of which two, will not be found sufficient to entitle God to the honour of the first cause of his creatures actions; and of the latter will (unless we take our measures amiss) inforce him to grant that *Predetermination* which now he denies. First as to *Conservation*, we must observe, that as Creation stands opposed to nothing; so Conservation to Annihilation, *i. e.* making that cease to be something which was so; and it differs from Creation only in this, that it notes a continuation of that being, and its powers and faculties, which were given by creation, as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced; and therefore is commonly stiled *continua creatio*, and not unfitly termed by the School-men *manutenentia Dei*, i. e. *Gods hand-hold*, because by it God holds up all things, as it were, with an hand from falling into nothing; by the withdrawing of which, Divines generally think the world would be annihilated.

Secondly, As to *concourse* or *concurrence*, it

it may be thus defined; *It is an extrinsick action of God, by which he does with second causes,* [*or the creatures*] *immediately produce all their natural actions and effects.* 1. *It is an action of God* to distinguish it from the power communicated and conserved to second causes, (by which they perform their several operations) by *creation* and *conservation.* 2. *Extrinsick* to distinguish it from his Decree of this action called *concourse,* which decree is an intrinsick action. 3. *With second causes,* or the creatures, because it is such an action as joins with the creature; as when the Writing-Master and the Scholar shape the same letter by the Masters guiding the Scholars hand. 4. I add, *all their actions,* and what is produced by action or the *effects,* as when the Master and Scholar write, not only is the action the same, but the effect; the letters are the same which are done by both together. 5. *Natural actions and effects,* to exclude what by accident adheres to the actions and effects; which seeing they are defects, cannot be produced by a proper efficiency, and so nor God concur to the production of them by such efficiency. 6. *Immediately produce,* to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions; which is such, that one

and

and the ſame action is the action of God and of the creature.

3. As to *Predetermination*, it is thus defined. *It is a tranſient action of God which excites every creature to act.* It is called *a tranſient action of God*, in oppoſition to *Immanent*, or the Will and Decree of God that the creature ſhould act. That is diſtinguiſhed from Concourſe or Concurrence thus: 1. The very difference of the particles, *Præ* and *Con*, i. e. *Before* and *with*, notes that the former is in order of nature (though not of time), *before* the creatures action, the latter with it. 2. That the former notes the reduction of the creatures powers into act: the latter notes Gods acting with the creature. 3. The former is to be conceived of *per modum principii*, under the notion of a principle, or cauſe of the creatures acting: the latter only, *per modum actionis*, i. e. as importing Gods acting with the creature. 4. The *Terminus* or object of that action of Gods, which we call *Predetermination*, is the ſecond cauſe it ſelf, the reaſonable creature: but the *Terminus* or object of that action of Gods, called *concourſe* or *concurrence*, is the action of the ſecond cauſe, and effect produced by that action. So that the Queſtion in plain words is, *Whether God does move men to all their natural actions, and*

and ſo to one rather than another. The Proteſtants generally maintain the affirmative, and how forcibly Mr. *Howe* oppoſes it, remains now to be conſidered.

The terms explained, we ſhall endeavour a defence of our Arguments, which Mr. *Howe* hath thought meet to ſingle out.

The firſt of the two Arguments of ours; which *ſeeming moſt importunate and enforcing*, he hath attempted to enervate, is.

Arg. 1. *That it neceſſarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the firſt Cauſe of whatſoever Being; and conſequently, that what there is of poſitive Being in any the moſt wicked action, muſt principally owe it ſelf to the determinative productive influence of this firſt and Soveraign Cauſe: Otherwiſe, it would ſeem that there were ſome Being that were neither* primum, *nor* a primo, [*i. e. neither the firſt Being, nor from the firſt Being*], Let. p. 35.

Anſw. To which he Anſwers, *It may well be thought ſufficiently to ſalve the rights and priviledges of the firſt Cauſe, to aſſert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it; which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may uſe or not uſe as they pleaſe, without over-aſſerting, that they muſt be irreſiſtibly determined alſo, even to the worſt of actions done by them,* Let. p. 36.

Reply.

Reply. For the better understanding of our Argument, and the proof thereto annexed; together with Mr *Howes* Answer thereunto, it will not be unneedful to reduce them to Syllogisms: the Argument thus,

All positive Being are effects of the first Cause. All sinful actions, as actions, [for that is our limitation], are positive Beings. *Ergo*, All sinful actions [as actions] are effects of the first Cause, [*viz.* God].

The Major [or first proposition] is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogism, thus: If all positive Beings are not effects of the first Cause, then there is some positive Being which is neither *primum* [*ens*] nor *a primo*, [i. e.] neither the first Being, nor from the first Being, [or which is neither God nor a Creature]. But there is no positive Being which is neither the first Being, nor from the first Being. *Ergo*, All positive Beings are effects of the first Cause. To the Argument it self Mr. *Howe* replies nothing, nor yet to the proof, in form (as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged). But seems to distinguish in the Major between a double dependance, which positive Beings have upon God as the first Cause; one, that they have no power but from God; the other, that the exercise or use of that power is from God

God. The former he grants; the latter he denies, but with a limitation as to forbidden actions.

To which we Reply,

1. That this Answer is fatal to his own Concession of *Gods immediate concurrence to all the actions of his Creatures*, Postsc. p. 28. For it amounts to as much, as if *in terminis*, he had asserted a mediate concurrence only to some actions, (*viz.* forbidden actions; and this was the passage I presume that gave Mr. *Gale* occasion to charge Mr. *Howe* with *Durandus* his Opinion, which was, That God concurs remotely and mediately with second Causes, (*viz.*) no otherwise than as he confers and conserves their Essence and Power of action, by which they themselves act nextly and immediately. And for ought I can yet understand a very just occasion; for though Mr. *Howe* in the place above-cited acknowledges immediate concurrence; yet in the Letter it self, by which Mr. *Gale* was to make an estimate of his judgment, there was *ne gru quidem*, not a Syllable of any such thing.

2. It is hard to conceive the reason of Mr. *Howe's* limitation; why forbidden actions should be only by power derived from God; and good actions or indifferent, require also an irresistible determination; when

when the material of the actions morally diversified is often the very same. For instance, In the motion of my hand to kill another out of spleen and private revenge, or to kill my enemy in a lawful self-defence, or to strike my friend in merriment. I am aware that he attempts to wipe off the aspersion of symbolizing with *Durandus*, because he denies immediate concourse universally, whereas himself denies only determinative concourse to wicked actions, *Postsc. p.* 28, 29. And be it so, that his attempt hath been successful, yet I must give *Durandus* the precedence of Mr. *Howe* for sagacity in this point; and do judg that he spake more consonantly to himself, and the truth, when he affirmed that the indetermination of the power given to the creature, was so universal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good. For it seems evident enough that all natural actions, as such, [the Subjects of moral good and evil] must either have, or want immediate concurrence.

3. This Answer runs counter to Mr. *Howe*'s assertion elsewhere, *That in reference to sinful actions by this influence* [determinative] *God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done*, [which is all Mr. *Howe* hath granted us hither-

hitherto in his Answer to our Argument, from the dependance of the second Cause upon the first]; *but also as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action*, &c. *Postsc.* p. 41. For if by exciting and actuating the powers, he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from *Durandus* to *Twisse*: for the latter (nor we who follow him) neither says nor means any more by Predetermination. And we cannot tell what other meaning to affix to his words, without upbraiding him with strange inadvertency in his choice of them. For else he confounds Concurrence either with *Conservation*; which latter keeps the powers apt and habile [as they are made] or with *Predetermination*, whereas this goes before, that goes along with the Creatures act.

But now I attend to the proof of his strange Assertion, for a proof I understand it to be) though he introduces it with a *Besides*; (a particle which commonly is a sign of an additional Argument) which thus presents it self.

Ans. *It seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of such a nature as being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to*

its

its nature, ſhould be capable of acting, unleſs whatſoever he thus enables, he determine [*that is, for it can mean no leſs thing, impel*] *it to do it alſo.* Let. p. 36, 37.

Rep. 1. If we ſhould take liberty of judging things by their appearance at firſt ſight, without giving our ſelves the trouble of a ſtrict diſquiſition, we might eaſily be ſeduced into an imagination, that it does no leſs infinitely detract from the Divine Perfection, to affirm, That God was not able to make a Creature of ſuch a nature, as that it might continually ſuſtain it ſelf, without a ſupply of power every moment from God; for that opinion ſeems to tye God to a ſhorter tedder, than an ingenuous Artificer, who can raiſe an Edifice that ſhall laſt many years, without any need of his help for reparations.

And this I the rather take notice of, becauſe I find it the ſentiment of the moſt acute *Suarez*, *That they who deny Gods immediate Operation in every action of the Creature*, [which Mr. *H.* ſeems to do in his Anſwer now under diſcuſſion] *will doubtleſs be compelled to deny that the Creature does depend immediately upon the actual influence of God. For* (which is his reaſon) *that which depends not upon God in acting, nor does it depend upon him in its being.* Met. Diſp. 20.

2. This confirmation of Mr. *H.* Assertion is guilty of two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity, *(viz.)* a too early *anticipation*, and immodest *begging* of the main *Question*. An *anticipation*, in alledging the *impelling*, i. e. *compelling* (for that is his sense of the term, as will appear e're long) men to act, as the import of Predetermining; whereas there is no necessity of hooking in such an import of it: for suppose it no way to abridg the liberty of the Will, yet by Mr. *H*'s Argumentation, it is *eo nomine* to be rejected, because the sustaining the Creature and supplying it with power every moment suitable to its nature, [that is, in *Durandus* stile, *mediate concurrence*] is to be judged sufficient to enable the Creature to act, without determining it to action; upon no less peril to them that shall dare to judg it insufficient, than to be reputed detracters from the Perfection of the ever-blessed God. And a *begging of the Question* 'tis, which I may well call immodest, because he knows we neither can nor will grant it, without ruining our Hypothesis; nor need we do it, because he elsewhere owns it *unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case determine the will of a rational Creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature.* Let. p. 141.

I confess he gives us here but an inch, but we

we will venture to take an ell; I mean, to extend his conceſſion of ſome caſes to every caſe, and particularly to our caſe of ſinful actions. For let our ſentiment be burdened with what other load Mr. *H.* ſhall pleaſe (as the truth is he is not over-merciful to the Predeterminants) I think he hath diſcharged it of forcing the will, till he hath evinced a ſpecialty in our caſe, which will be ſomewhat an uneaſie task, though we ſhould grant him his own option, that God predetermines to ſinful actions *in concreto*, i.e. to the actions and ſinfulneſs of them too; for upon that ſuppoſition there is leſs neceſſity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans [corrupt] nature; becauſe he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propenſion to of it ſelf; and ſo Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back, which puts him on a little faſter in the way he was going before.

3. We are at a great loſs as to Mr. *H*'s meaning, whether it be that it is a detraction from Gods perfection, to affirm, God was not able to make a Creature that could not act univerſally without determination, or particularly as to forbidden actions; the generality of the terms calls for the former ſenſe, the concluſion he was to prove, for the latter.

1. If the former ſenſe be that he will own, I ſeem to my ſelf fairly allowed to infer, that then man in his primitive ſtate had not, nor have the good Angels at preſent, any Divine determination to good actions, becauſe to both unneceſſary; and unneceſſary it muſt be preſumed, becauſe it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of ſuch a nature, as that they ſhould not need it, and becauſe they had no *diſinclination to be overcome by an efficaciouſly determinative influence*, (which is the reaſon Mr. *H.* gives of the neceſſity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapſed ſtate. *Poſt.* p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unneceſſary to a ſtate of Integrity.) And if this inference be natural, I wonder not that Man fell, but that he fell not as ſoon as he was ſet upon his legs; nor that ſome of the good Angels turned Rebels ſo ſoon to their Soveraign Lord, but how the reſt perſevere in their Loyalty. I have hitherto ſwom with the ſtream of Proteſtant Divines, (not becauſe it was eaſie, but in my apprehenſion ſafe) who have conceived the good Angels ſecurity an effect of a greater degree of *determinative influence*, (to borrow Mr. *H*'s Phraſe) or *corroborating grace*, that is, in the terms of the Queſtion now agitated, Predetermination, than was afforded to the [now] bad Angels; or to ſpeak more ſtrictly

ly of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one, which was ſuſpended as to the other: which conception of Divines (to note that in paſſage) may be eaſily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon Gods Holineſs, Juſtice, or Truth; upon the firſt, becauſe God by the ſuſpenſion of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels ſin, than the Sun of the darkneſs that overſpreads the air, when it hath withdrawn its rays; upon the ſecond, for it is a ruled caſe in the Schools, *Non datur juſtitia proprie dicta inter Deum & Creaturas*; i.e. *God cannot be properly ſaid to be a debtor to his Creatures*; no not when he hath paſſed a promiſe to them, for even then, (if we will ſpeak ſtrictly) he is a debtor to himſelf, namely to his own truth and fidelity, not to them; and if he ſhould (to ſuppoſe an impoſſibility for illuſtration-ſake) break his word, he would be but *Mendax*, *non injurius*, a *Lyar*, *not unjuſt*. Not upon his Truth, for he was not under the bond of a promiſe, (as he is to the part of repaired Mankind, whom we denominate Saints) to preſerve the Angels from Apoſtacy. As for thoſe who take this Doctrine for a blemiſh upon Gods goodneſs, I turn them over to God himſelf, for a reconciliation of theſe two ſeemingly contradictory Propoſitions, contained in his Word, and within the verge of

our own experience, that God is good, and [yet] that he hath permitted a passage for sin, which he could have impeded.——If the latter sense be avowed, as a genuine interpretation of Mr. *H*'s mind; I know not how it will be able to save its credit, if I should charge it with being guilty of this grois absurdity, *viz.* a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful actions *in concreto*, i. e. the natural actions, and sin that adheres to them. 'Tis true, God made Man mutable, and how could he do otherwise? (unless he should have made him a God) which very terms involve an insufferable contradiction) and so in a remote capacity of sinning. But Mr. *H*'s words import a next or immediate capacity of acting, which the Creature is capable of, as soon as it starts out of nothing into something, without the intervenient aid of Predetermination. I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. *H*'s meaning; and I would offer him a friendly hand (if he would accept of it) to help him out of the pit he is fallen into, by minding him of our distinction between the *materiale* and *formale* of sin, the natural action that is the subject, and the sin that is the [inseparable] adjunct, in our temporary estate: which distinction supposed, in conjunction with Mr. *H*'s Hypothesis, Mr. *H*'s meaning will be freed from the *encumbrance*

now

now inferred upon it ; and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man, ſuffices to the natural actions, ſince ſin adhered to them, as well as before, without the help of Predetermination. But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the iſſue ; for though it may clear him of one, yet it will entangle him in many abſurdities, or (at leaſt ſelf-contradictions: For then,

1. How ſhall he quit himſelf from the blame of being a Favourer of *Durandus Hypotheſis*? for the ſenſe is the ſame, and the words not much different. And yet why ſhould he once attempt it, ſeeing that Hypotheſis ſerves his profeſſed deſign of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin, with much officiouſneſs: and that he may accept this ſuggeſtion the more kindly, a moſt Learned hand ſhall tender it to him: *Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence, but mediate only, in reſpect of voluntary agents. And according to this opinion it is eaſie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with ſecond Cauſes, in producing their defective effects. If the will of the Creature*, ſaith *Scotus*, C. 2. Diſt. 37. Q. 1. *were the total and immediate cauſe of her action, and that God had no immediate efficiency, but mediate only in reſpect thereof, as*

some think: It were easie according to that opinion to shew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes, for the producing of their effects: for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin, the will only should be the total cause of it, and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately, in that he caused and produced such a will, that might at her pleasure do what she would. Durandus *seemeth to incline to this opinion, supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves, and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same, but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working, which first he gave them.* Thus far the most Learned Dr. *Field*, of the Church, *B.* 3. *Ch.* 23. *pag.* 121, 122. And yet he adds his dislike of *Durandus* opinion in these words: *But they that are of sounder judgment resolve, that as the light enlightneth the air, and with the air all other inferiour things: so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes, and preserveth them in the same, but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them, &c.* Ibid. p. 122.

3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the *material* and

and *formal part of ſin*? [approved of above by Dr. *Field*]. *Moſt of his way*, (viz. Mr. *Gales*) *mince the buſineſs, and ſay, the concurrence is only to the action, which is ſinful; not as ſinful*, ſo Mr. *Howe*'s *Poſtſc.* p. 33.

Anſw. *Except it were affirmed, that it implied a contradiction for God to make ſuch a creature, there is no imaginable pretence, why it ſhould not be admitted he hath done it*, Let. p. 37. and ſubjoins ſoon after, *I muſt confeſs a greater diſpoſition to wonder that ever ſuch a thing ſhould be diſputed, than diſpute ſo plain a caſe*, p. 38.

Reply. That it is affirmed, Mr. *Howe* cannot ſurely be ignorant; nay, he frees himſelf from that blame. I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impoſſible, *p.* 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himſelf.

This Argument, *ab abſurdo*, from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himſelf, is urged againſt thoſe that deny *immediate concurrence* (and ſo by juſt conſequence *conſervation*) and *Predetermination*.

1. As to *mediate concurrence*, 'tis urged for it by *Durandus*, *That there is no repugnnncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that ſhould be able to act without his*

his help [*otherwise, that is, than by conserving its being and powers*]. To this is Answered, *Involvere repugnantiam quod creatura sit potens*, &c. *That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction, that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator, as well in respect of the created cause it self, which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being, as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it; for seeing they are Beings by participation, they essentially depend upon the first Being. Wherefore, as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being, so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting.* Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another, than *Durandus* Argument to Mr. *Howe*'s; nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto, no, though Mr. *Howe* should acknowledg *immediate concurrence*, (as in his *Postsc.* he does) of which, in his whole Letter there is *altum silentium*, and deny only *Predetermination*: for this Answer is a shoo that will fit either foot (as will appear in its place).

2. As to *conservation*, the no necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too, *That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures, as when once made, may*

may continue their Being; though the operation of the Agent cease, by which they were produced. To this Argument *Suarez* also fits a rational reply; *Ad amplitudinem divinæ potentiæ spectat, &c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power, that nothing is, nor can be a moment after its production without its influence; and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures, and an intrinsick power of annihilating them, by the suspension or withholding of his influence,* Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2, 17.

3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. *Howe*'s explication of his mind, *that he does really believe Gods immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis & suppositi, yet not determinative to wicked actions,* Postlc. p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination, *i. e.* applying it to action, and to one rather than another action; and 'tis this, that such a creature would be but *ens secundarium*, a *second being*; not *causa secunda*, a *second cause*, or (which is all one) God should be but *ens primum*, not *causa prima*, the *first Being*, not the *first Cause*; which I prove thus.

Arg. 1. If God does concur only by *simultaneous concourse*, and not by *Predetermination*.

mination, or *previous motion*, then God cannot be the cauſe of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them. But the *conſequent* is abſurd; and Mr. *Howe*, I preſume, will not own it. Therefore ſo is the *Antecedent*. The *Conſequence* is proved thus: God is not by concourſe the cauſe of the actions of the creatures, as thoſe actions proceed from them, becauſe then concourſe muſt be before the action of the creature (for every Phyſical cauſe is before the effect), but the very name *concourſe*, imports a joyning together in the ſame action, as the Maſter and Scholar, whoſe hand is guided in ſhaping the ſame letter. And all conſent, in *concourſe*, neither does God act before the creature, nor the creature before God, but both together, and at once.

Arg. 2. To make good the Engliſh Proverb, *He is twice killed, that is killed with his own weapon.* I ſhall retort, Mr. *Howe*'s two conceſſions upon him.

1. If *there be an immediate concourſe*, then there is a Predetermination, or putting the creature upon action before it acts; or elſe the creature is the firſt mover of it ſelf to action. The *conſequence* is plauſible enough, as depending on this ground, that by concourſe alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual

individual action rather than another. As for instance, in the state of innocency, when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden, all good and fit for food, whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another. The concourse of God with *Adam's* will in the election of one (suppose that in the midst of the Garden, before the prohibition passed upon it) could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest, as is plain in external actions. Two men lanching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect; but the one does not determine the other, by lending common assistance to that act. There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature, though not of time, to that act of *Adam*'s will [supposed] of eating that tree instanced in, to which God concurred. This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar, wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing, and its effect the letter written; and also a Predetermination, a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing, (not *morally*, for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself; but *Physically*, by putting his hand on the Scholars to write, and to write one letter rather than another. An account how the particular action of any rational creatures

creatures will, comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination, I know none can be given. Not by chance, upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object; because the action is Gods (who is not liable to any such impressions) as well as the creatures; not by the *creatures self-determining power*, for that, as such, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined. And these two Propositions are so evident, that *concurrence immediate* does not determine the will, and that yet it must be determined, that *Baronius* himself, who is an Antipredeterminant, does acknowledg both, *Met.* 7, 8. *Disp.* 3. *n.* 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience, which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will. *Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei, quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire*, i. e. *That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out.* Baron. Met. 7, 12. D. 2. n. 59. [which necessity, that it excludes not the liberty of mans will, shall be cleared in due time].

2. Again, from the necessity conceded by Mr. *Howe*, of *immediate concourse and Predetermination to the production of good actions*,

ons, we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions: This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all actions, or peculiar to good actions. The removing the latter, will be the fixing the former in its due place. In order hereunto, we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties, and fitting them for good actions; which as it was concreated with them in innocency; so in the lapsed estate it is re-created, or created again by infusion: which *infusion* is not *Predetermination*: for this latter still presupposes the former. There must be grace in habit before it can be acted. Now then the Query is, whether the *terminus* of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties; not the *habit*, for that is a Quality that *meliorates* the faculties, and so the actions, *in genere morali*, and cannot be put upon action, or one rather than another, but *mediante potentia*, by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit resides. It must then be the *faculties*; the will for instance (for of that is the grand inquiry), for otherwise (supposing what has been owned, that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions) in what degree the habits are confirmed, in that the will may act without Predetermination, and produce sincerely

good

good actions as it pleaſe, as long as theſe good *actions are done by a power derived originally from it*, [which is Mr. *Howe*'s Hypotheſis, and judged by him *ſufficient to ſalve the rights and priviledge of the firſt cauſe, with reference to forbidden actions*, Let. p. 36. [and I ſee not, why not as well with reference to commanded actions]. The reſult of this ratiocination will be, that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another neceſſary; and the poſſibility of action contained in the powers, that makes the reducing of that poſſibility to action no leſs neceſſary to good actions, then the conſequence ſeems immovable, that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike neceſſary to all actions, even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations. * *Quod erat demonſtrandum* And to me this Argument ſeems to carry along with it *triumphant evidence*, (to borrow one of Mr. *Howe*'s lofty Epithetes, *Let.* p. 62.) my fancy labours under ſo deſpicable poverty as to be unable to ſupply me with any evaſion.

As for Mr. *Howe*'s phraſe of *impelling*, by which he intends *compelling*, we ſhall refer the word and thing to the Head, where it will moſt properly fall under examination.

amination. In the interim, let us attend to what he subjoins.

Answ. *I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends, both humane and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight,* Let. p. 38.

Reply. These words imply, that all moral Government, *&c.* is rendred ludicrous, and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination; but upon what Mr. *Howe*, magisterially enough, takes for granted, but does not once make an offer of proving, that the will is hindered by *Gods own irresistible counter-action*, p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government: But if I live till that be proved, my age will certainly exceed *Methuselahs*.

Answ. But Mr. *Howe* adds, *The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather chuse to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not besides disputed, or even torn from us, than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief, that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing,* Let. p. 19.

Reply. The ſum of the Argument, though accompanied with a long train of fine words, is, that Predetermination to ſinful actions croſſes the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodneſs and Holineſs. To which we return.

1. That there is not the leaſt colour for any ſuch conſequence from our Doctrine, but upon ſuppoſition of two things; which Mr. *Howe* would faſten upon us, but we diſown.

1. That *God predetermines to ſinful actions, in concreto*, i e. to the natural action, and the ſinfulneſs of it: which we conſtantly deny: for though we own it a hard province to anſwer all objections that may be ſtarted againſt this partition made between the one and the other, as to Gods influence, which we affirm as to the former, *the action*, and deny, as to the latter, *the ſinfulneſs of it*: yet we doubt not (in its ſeaſon) to evince theſe two things, that God is the Author, and conſequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures, (for as to irrational, though we include them, yet the Queſtion not being of them, we ſhall not intermeddle with them); and that God is not the Author of the ſinfulneſs, and ſo not the Predeterminer thereof. And then as to the *modus*, or manner of Gods influence, ſo as to ſeparate

parate these that are so neerly conjoined in sinful creatures, we shall be less solicitous, at least with respect to Mr. *Howe*'s satisfaction, who has professed that he *can more easily be satisfied, to be ignorant of the modus*, [i. e. manner], *or medium*, [i. e. the mean] *of Gods knowledg, whilest he is sure of the thing; and he knows not why any sober-minded man might not be so too, while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, of the nature too of a thousand things besides, when, that such things there are, we have no doubt. And when there are few things about which we can with less disadvantage suffer our being ignorant, or with less disreputation profess to be so*, Let. p. 49, 50. And if this Argumentation be true, in reference to Divine acts in general (as there is no reason why it should be limited to Gods knowledg only, and himself extends it beyond that); I conceive Mr. *Howe* has against his will given us the cause; for that God is not the Author of sin (our last proposition) he every where affirms as well as we. That God is the Author of all the actions of rational creatures, he grants too; or else his words are unintelligible, and we have cause to quarrel with him, (as he did with *Persius*, a crabbed Poet), *si non vult intelligi, cur vult legi*, i. e. If he would not be understood,

why would he be read, (an end that every man is presumed to intend that writes), these words, I mean, *This active providence of God about all the actions of men, consists not meerly in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers*, Postsc. p. 39. By which last clause, if he intends *reducing them to act* (as his phrase is, *ibid.*) we are perfectly agreed so far; and the remaining disagreement will be but about the *modus* or *manner*, how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with sin, and yet none upon the sin it self. And of this he and I being both (I hope) sober-minded men, may well be content to be ignorant, as long as we are sure of the thing. But I fear I reckon without my Host, and so must reckon again; I mean, that Mr. *Howe* will not stand to my comprimize of the difference between us, though I see not why he should not, if he will be but a man of his word, stand, that is, to his own Assertions.

2. Our Doctrine cannot be accused of a confederacy, to raze out the impressions of Gods Holiness upon humane nature; but upon this supposition also, *That God does irresistibly determine the wills of men to that which he punishes men for*, viz. *to sin*, which is a brat we are not bound to fa-

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ther. For we neither own *irreſiſtible* nor *reſiſtible* determination of mans will to ſin, as ſuch; nor do we acknowledg any determination of the will at all to be *irreſiſtible*, if he takes that term for equivalent to *compulſory*; which if he do not, it will be neither a friend to him, nor foe to us.

We might alſo obſerve upon his Rhetorical amplifications of his Argument, that he ſeems to be no ill-willer to *Tranſubſtantiation*. For if *the natural notions of Gods goodneſs ſhould be infinitely dearer to us than our ſenſes*, I ſee not why the notion of Gods ſincerity, that he means as he ſpeaks, ſhould not challenge a ſhare in our indearments; and ſo why, *Hoc eſt corpus meum*, ſhould not aſſure us, that the bread is tranſubſtantiated, though our ſenſes, ſight, taſte, feeling, join in a common teſtimony, that it remains bread after conſecration, as well as before: not that I charge him with that *Popiſh ridicule*, but I would have him take notice how dangerous ſometimes an affectation of embelliſhments of ſpeech may prove, by leaving him that is guilty of it, at the mercy of his Antagoniſt, in deducing ſuch inferences from them, as can neither be ſafely admitted, nor creditably turned off.

Anſw. Mr. *Howe* complains of the *feeble-*

bleneſs and impotency of our defence againſt the forenamed charge, *that God makes a Law, and neceſſitates the violation of it*; when it is no more than, *That man is under the Law, and God above it*, Let. p. 40, 41. and he affirms, *that a tender ſpirit*, &c. *will not be relieved or eaſed by the thin Sophiſtry of only a colluſive ambiguity in the word Law*, &c. *ibid.*

Reply. If Mr. *Howe*'s candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Eloquence, he would never have thus repreſented our Anſwer. For the truth is, this Anſwer is not given by the *Predeterminants* to that objection to which he applies it (as is plain enough, becauſe we always eſteem our ſelves unconcerned in the charge of repreſenting God as neceſſitating the violation of his own Law), but to another, (*viz.*) *that God ſins when he produces that action with man, which to man is ſin*, (which Mr. *Howe*, who in words at leaſt owns *immediate concurrence* to all actions as well we, is therefore equally concerned to anſwer). For the proof of this, I ſhall alledg *Bellarmine*, who (after he had told us, it was only *Zuinglius*'s Anſwer to the ſame Objection that Mr. *H.* fits it to; adds with the peril of his reputation), *Sententiam tamen aliorum quorundam, &c.* i. e. *That it was the opinion of others alſo, who*

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though they agreed not with Zuinglius, *in teaching that God impels men to ſin, yet they uſe no other medium to evince how God does not ſin, when he produces that action with man, which to man is ſin, than that God is bound by no Law, and nothing is ſin but a tranſgreſſion of a Law,* Bell. de Amiſſ. Gr. l. 2. c. 18. Yet withal I deny not, but 'tis alſo applied to that Objection, that God ſins, if he does determine to that action, to which ſin inſeparably cleaves. But yet *the neceſſitation of the violation of the Law,* is no way concerned in the objection.

What now is become of Mr. *Howe*'s charge of *thin Sophiſtry*, and *colluſive ambiguity*, when we deny God to be under a *Law*, in the ſame ſignification of the word, wherein we affirm it of man, (*viz.* as Mr. *Howe* expreſſes it), *For the declared pleaſure of a Ruler to a Subject*, p. 41. This charge diſproved, we yet grant what Mr. *Howe* objects; that the term *Law*, as noting *an habitual principle, and rule of acting after one ſteady tenour, in which ſenſe the perfect rectitude of Gods nature is an eternal Law to him*, &c. *Let. p.* 41, 42, is yet an Argument againſt our opinion upon Mr. *Howe*'s *Hypotheſis*, that thereby the creature is neceſſitated to ſin: but that he hath neither attempted, nor ever will be able to prove. If proof could be made

that the consequence were natural, we should not know how to decline the force of *Bellarmine*'s grave Argumentation upon Mr. *Howe*'s ground, *Licet deo non sit posita Lex ab aliquo superiore Legislatore, tamen sua sapientia est ipsi Lex*, &c. *i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a superiour Legislatour, yet his own wisdom is a Law to him; and as* Zuinglius *himself teaches us, That what a Law is to us, that is Gods own nature to him. God is therefore no less bound, not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature, than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God. Wherefore, if God should impel* [Mr. *Howe*'s phrase], *men to these things, which are contrary to the Eternal Law, and to his own nature and wisdom, as to Adultery, his will were evil, because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom, and God should deny himself, which cannot be (as the Apostle says).* Thus far *Bellarmine, ubi supra.*

Answ. Mr. *Howe* concludes, *What relief is there in that dream,* [*of the supposed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself*]. *For what can be supposed more repugnant? or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it punishable? A Law already made in the case, how can it be innocent?* Let. p. 42.

Reply.

Reply. Mr. *Howe* leaves us wholly at a loſs, who it is, that with this dream hath attempted *to relieve a pious and ſober mind, cloſely urged with the horrour of ſo black a conception of God, that he does firſt irreſiſtibly determine mens will to, and then puniſh them for the hatred of his bleſſed ſelf,* (as he tragically, but *falſely* repreſents our opinion), *p.* 40. I ſay *falſely*, for God does not puniſh that natural paſſion we call hatred, which himſelf, as firſt Cauſe, applies the ſecond to the production of; nor does God determine the will to that natural paſſion, its elicite act, *irreſiſtibly*, in his ſenſe *forcibly*. But as *Auſtin* long ago, of Gods influence upon good actions; [ſo ſay we of bad] God acts *Omnipotenter pro te, ſuaviter pro me, Omnipotently according to his own nature, but ſweetly according to ours,* (as ſhall be fully cleared in its place). If any particular perſon of our judgment in the main, ſhall propoſe an argument liable to exception, I ſee not that we are obliged to defend it. But as Mr. *Howe* introduces it, it ſeems to be repreſented as a common extravagancy of the Predeterminants, which I am ſure it is not; nor does Mr. *Howe* labour under a ſurguedry of candour, in a bare preſentation of this ſuppoſition, without its application to the Queſtion. Both which, becauſe Mr. *Howe* hath neglected,

neglected, I think not my ſelf obliged to give the Reader an account of, but ſhall diſmiſs it without any adoe.

Arg. 2. The ſecond preſſing and importunate Argument of ours which Mr. *H.* repeats, *That God does predetermine ſinful actions as actions, otherwiſe it were impoſſible for God to foreknow the ſinful actions of men (many whereof he hath foretold) if their futurition were a meer contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the ſubordinate agent, not determined by the ſupream agent* [God.] Let. p. 35, 36.

Anſ. To which Argument, this is the ſum of his Anſwer, *That this ſuppoſed indetermination of the Will in reference to wicked actions, is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them, which is a ſmall inconvenience, and manifeſt abſurdity not to acknowledg the like in many caſes, ſeeing God does many things, whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor underſtand.* Let. p. 47, 48.

Rep. 1. To which I reply, That the way how God foreknows future contingencies, is in his own Decree, at leaſt as to ſuch which he hath decreed. For I cannot divine what can be oppoſed to this Propoſition, That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree, (though it ſhould be granted that

that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner, which we can neither explicate nor understand.) Taking that then for granted till it be denied, I think Mr. *H.* hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingencies. For either he must exclude *the good actions*, which he grants *God predetermines men to*, Postsc. p. 39. yea, and *all actions* of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords *immediate concourse*, p. 28. from being *Contingencies*; (which himself as well as we, suppose in the whole controversie now agitated) Or deny that they fall under Gods Decree; (which is too absurd, because there's nothing more evident than that what God does in time, he decreed to do from Eternity) Or if he grants both, then it roundly follows, that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to, or concur with; and such are all the actions of men disjunctively.

Rep. 2. We shall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree, and consequently the sinful actions of men.

1. By Scripture, *Isa.* 46. 9, 10, *I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my*

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counsel shall stand, and I will do all my plea-sure. Upon which Scripture the *Incomparable Calvin*, (so I call him in compliance with the very Learned *Andrews*, (sometime Bishop of *Winchester*'s admonition), that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour) thus glosses, *Neque solum ejus præscientiam hic commendat*, &c. i.e. *Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience, but he affirms that he had testified by the Prophets what he had decreed. For there were no certainty, nor firmness in the Predictions, or Propheſies, unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass, had the event of things in his own hand.* As to which words we may further observe:

1. *The form of the expression:* two Attributes are here applied by God to himself, Wisdom and Soveraignty or liberty of Will, and a common adjunct of both, Immutability, [or we may call it a common effect, the certainty of the event] that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself, shall certainly come to pass.

2. *The extent of it*, that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow, *viz.* all that should certainly come to pass. For as *Judicious Calvin* observes upon *vers.* 11. *Posteaquam Propheta*, &c. *After that the Prophet had spoken of*

of the Preſcience of God, he accommodates the general expreſſion he had uſed to his preſent purpoſe, to comfort the Jews *in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus*, &c.

3. *The argument which is couched in them*, to evince the certainty of Gods foreknowledg of what he did predict, *viz.* becauſe the events predicted were the reſult of his Wiſdom and Pleaſure, or of his own wiſe Decrees.

And now to draw down this General to the particular in queſtion, *Whether God foreknows ſinful actions in his own Decree.* And for the proof of the affirmative I ſhall quote but that place, *Act.* 4. 28, compared with *Chap.* 2. 23, *For to do whatſoever thy hand and thy counſel determined before to be done.* So the former place, *Him being delivered by the determinate counſel and foreknowledg of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain.* So the latter; both ſpeaking of the moſt wicked action that ever was done in the world, the putting the Lord of Life to death. To the former place the *Learned Calvin* ſays, *They who acknowledg only the Preſcience of God, but do not confeſs that all things are managed by Gods will, are eaſily convinced by theſe words, that God hath foreordained that to be done which is done.* To the latter place the Learned Dr. *Manton* (now newly deceaſed, to the great grief of

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Pious & Learned Men) affords a notable gloss, (which I especially recommend to Mr *H.* for the friendship sake between the Doctor and him, in his Comment on *Jam.* 1. 13. p. 101. *Many who grant Prescience, deny Preordination,* [viz. the Decree, whereof Predetermination is the execution; So I understand him] *lest they should make God the Author of Sin: but these fear where no fear is. The Scripture speaketh roundly, ascribing both to God,* Act. 2. 23. [*N.B.*] Peter *saith not only* τῇ προγνώσει, *by the foreknowledg; but* τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ, *determinate counsel; which implieth a positive Decree.* So far he: and for ought I know consonantly to the constant sense of Protestantism, till now of late that it grows weary of it self, (if we may judg of its present humour by Mr *H.* and Mr. *B.*) And by these sound Interpretations we may easily judg, whether Mr. *H.*'s gloss upon *Act.* 4. 28. doth not corrupt the Text. Let us hear it, if our patience can bear such an exercise. *That is, God foreseeing wicked hands would be prompt and ready for this tragick enterprise, his Soveraign power and wise counsel concurred with his foreknowledg, so only, and not with less latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed unto this execution,* Let. p. 29. And soon after, *Which purpose* (viz.) *of Christs to give himself to be a propitiation*

for

for the ſins of men by dying, it was determined [by God] not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way, p. 30. Theſe words plainly imply a denial of Gods foreknowledg of the Death of Chriſt, as conſequent to his Decree of that event, (which is ſufficiently confirmed by the Scriptures now quoted againſt that denial) and they imply an affirmation of a foreknowledg of Chriſts Death antecedent to Gods Decree; and ſo make a confuſion (where a diſtinction ought to be kept) between Gods foreknowledg of *poſſibles* and *futures*; or of what *may*, and of what *ſhall* come to paſs; and run Mr. *H.* into this abſurdity, to deny that any Decree paſſed upon the Death of Chriſt at all. For to what end ſhould he paſs a Decree, if he foreknew it would come to paſs without it? I cannot conceive how Mr. *H.* can rid his hands of this abſurdity, unleſs he ſhall affirm, the *paſſion*, but not the *action*, the death of Chriſt, but not their agency who put him to death was the object of Gods Decree. But then *Auſtin* will correct him by his gloſs upon that Text, 1 *Pet.* 3. 17, *For it is better, if the will of God be ſo, that ye ſuffer for well-doing than for evil doing. Sancti affliguntur ſecundum Dei voluntatem, &c.* i.e. *The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, but they cannot ſuffer unleſs wicked men act. He that wills the paſ-*

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ſion, wills the action. Aug. in Enchir. c. 100. And the *Philoſopher* will fall foul upon him with his maxim, *Actio & Paſſio ſunt idem motus.* i.e. *Action and Paſſion are one and the ſame motion.* And differ but as the way from *London* to *York*, and from *York* to *London*; and but as the aſcent and deſcent of the ſame Hill. And ſo it cannot be pretended with any colour, that the Decree of God includes the *Paſsion* of Chriſt, and excludes the *Jews* and Gentiles action about it. I will diſmiſs Mr. *H.* as to this Text without further exagitation, when I have but minded him of a paſſage of the acute *Twiſſe*, (who I preſume, is one of thoſe *pious and learned men, to whom his reverence is not extinguiſhed, notwithſtanding the badneſs of their opinion about Predetermination*, Poſt. p. 49.) *Dictata iſta Jeſuitica*, &c. *Thoſe Jeſuitical dictates of the foreſeen determination of the humane will before Gods Decree, are not the dictates diſſerentium Theologorum, ſed ſomniantium.* i.e. *Of Divines diſputing, but dreaming.* Twiſſ. Vind. Gr. L. 2. p. 1. Digr. 2. c. 1. p. 31. And ſo I have cried you quittance, *one dream for another.* [Let. p. 42.]

2. By reaſon we ſhall demonſtrate, that Gods foreknowledg of all future contingencies depend upon his Decree. And I ſhall chuſe to borrow (becauſe I have none of my own better) that of Dr. *Twiſſe*, which hath been

been esteemed irrefragable, says the Learned *Strangius*, who yet opposes it, but not with strength enough to overthrow it; and hath done us the favour to reduce the whole process of the Argumentation into form. *De Vol. Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 9. p. 626.*

Arg. 1. *What is future only by the Decree of God, that God necessarily foreknew by his Decree. But every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God.* Ergo, *every future contingent did God necessarily foreknow by his Decree.*

2. The *Minor* proved. *That which is future from Eternity, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But every future contingent is future from Eternity.* Ergo, *every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God.*

3. The *Major* of the last Syllogism proved. *That which from Eternity passed out of the condition of a thing possible, into the condition of a thing future, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But that which is future from Eternity did pass from Eternity out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future.* Ergo, *That which is future from Eternity is not future but by Gods Decree.*

4. The *Major* of the last Syllogism proved. *That which from Eternity passed out of the condition of a thing possible into the con-*

dition of a thing future, had for the cause of that passage the Decree of God, or no cause at all. But it cannot be said it had no cause at all. Ergo, *only the Decree of God was the cause of that passage out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future.*

5. The *Minor* of the last Syllogism proved. *Future contingents are either future in their own nature, or not future but by some cause determining their indifferent nature. But future contingents are not future in their own nature; else it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present. For what agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably.* Ergo, *future contingents must needs be future from some cause.*

6. The *Major* of the same fourth Syllogism proved. *If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condition of a possible thing into the condition of a future, that cause must be either something without God, or in God; and if in God, either that cause shall be the essence of God, or the knowledg of God, or the will and decree of God. But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future, is neither any thing without God, nor the essence or the knowledg of God.* Ergo, *it is only the will or decree of God.*

7. The *Minor* of the last Syllogism proved.

ved by parts. *For first, nothing out of God could be the cause, because that passage (which they call futurition) was made from eternity, and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity. But nothing is eternal besides God. Nor can the knowledg of God be the cause; for that severed from his will, doth rather suppose, than make things future. Moreover, if the Essence of God were the cause of this passage of things from possibility to futurity, it must either be said to be the cause as acting necessarily or freely. Not the former, for then all future things would fall out necessarily, and none would fall out contingently and freely. But God in things to be created, or created, hath done, nor doth any thing by necessity of nature, but freely. If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity, as acting freely, this is to grant, that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cause why any contingent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be, into the condition of a thing future, or to determine the futurition of it. It remains therefore that the Decree of God, or the Decreeing will of God, be alone the cause of futurition (if you will admit the phrase) and of its effect.* Thus far Dr. *Twisse*.

I desire the Reader to take notice, That though I have a great reverence for Dr.

Twiſſe, and do judg the proceſs of the above-cited Argument invincible as to the main; yet I am not clear in my apprehenſion, that the third Syllogiſm is in ſenſe different from the ſecond, (as *Strangius* objects againſt it with ſome probability.) Nor yet do I wholly diſlike *Strangius* his alteration of the terms of both the *Majors* of the ſecond and third *Syllogiſm*, thus: *That which from eternity was poſsible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future, its futurition is from the Decree of God. But every future contingent was from eternity poſsible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future.* Ergo, *the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God.* And then the fourth Syllogiſm will be the proof of the Major of the ſecond, (leaving out the third) and the words muſt be the ſame; and ſo the argument runs on without any further rub, unleſs perhaps the reaſon given in the fifth Syllogiſm, *Why contingent things are not future in their own nature*, becauſe then it would follow, *that they ſhould be always future, and never become preſent.*

For I confeſs ingenuouſly, that I cannot anſwer *Strangius* contrary conſequent from that antecedent; *That if future contingents were neceſſarily future, whether in their own nature, or in reſpect of any other cauſe, as the Decrees of God, they muſt neceſſarily be preſent*

ſent ſome time or other. For to be future is nothing elſe than that a thing ſhould ſometime be preſent. Strang. p. 630.

And theſe alterations (though I will not poſitively aſſert to be needful, as not having had time to examine *Strangius* throughly ſince he came to my hands, (which was long after Mr. *H*'s Letter and Poſtſcript came out,) yet I am the more willing to admit, that I may in part wipe off the aſperſion Mr. *H.* caſts upon many of us, who hold Predetermination, *That whatſoever ſtrength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter, that which hath too apparently had greateſt actual efficacy with many, hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation.* Let. p. 42.

As to all the reſt of the Doctor's Arguments, (if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities, an infirmity of lapſed humane nature, which I cannot challenge an exemption from,) I ſeem to my ſelf able to anſwer *Strangius*'s ſubtil evaſions, and ſhould willingly have done it, but that I doubt not but I ſhall meet with them in Mr. *H*'s threatened Rejoinder, in which I expect Mr. *H.* ſhould anſwer diſtinctly, by denial or diſtinction, to ſome Propoſition in theſe Syllogiſms; and then let him rhetoricate as he pleaſes in the amplification.

We have now diſpatched the two Argu-

ments in the *Letter*, there remain three in the *Postscript* cited out of Mr. *Gale*'s *Animadversions upon the Letter*; which, though modestly proposed by way of Question, will constringe our Learned Adversary.

Arg. 3. *Whether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mixture of sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful? for is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful the same?* Postscr. p. 32.

Mr. *H*'s Answ. 1. *It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful; which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied: though most of his way mince the business, and say, the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful.* Ibid. & pag. 33. So Mr. *H.*

Reply. Mr. *H.* misrepresents Mr. *Gale*'s meaning: for it is not, that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action, but to the action; which though physically one individual action, yet is morally diversified in respect of its conformity and disformity to the Law of God: so that considering the natural action *in concreto*, with the good or evil adhering to it, it is no less true, that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering

to

to it, than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it. This premiſed, to the fault he finds with the diſtinction, I anſwer, that I doubt he muſt recur to it himſelf, when he is preſſed, to know how Gods concurrence immediate to actions ſinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin: yea, worſe than ſo, I cannot imagine, but that as to thoſe actions, which he calls in themſelves ſinful, he muſt own what he would faſten upon Mr. *Gale*, that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as ſinful; *for 'tis impoſſible to ſeparate the malignity thereof from an intrinſecally evil action*, (as he tells us) *Let.* p. 33. [of which hereafter.)

Mr. *H*'s Anſw. 2. *This I am to conſider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it muſt be conceived, that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, love*, &c. *therefore to the acts of enmity againſt himſelf, curſing, idolatry*, &c. To which (beſides an unſeemly ſcoff, *is it not a mighty conſequence?*) Mr. *H.* anſwers divers things, as reaſons for the denial of the conſequence.

1. That it is infirm, becauſe *the actions* in the antecedent *are good, quoad ſubſtantiam*, but theſe in the conſequent *are in the ſubſtance of them evil.* Poſt. p. 33.

Reply 1. Mr. *Gale* doth not limit wicked

actions to those that are in the substance of them evil, but ampliates the term to all whatsoever: so that supposing the consequence were not good to such actions as Mr. *H.* instanceth in; yet it may be good to those actions that are evil, *quoad finem & circumstantias*, as to the end and circumstances. For instance, to be hospitable, or charitable out of vain-glory, to be reading the Scriptures at home, when we should attend upon publick worship, *&c.* and Mr. *H.* seems to yield it.

2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil, *quoad substantiam*. And it is a wonder to me, that our Learned Antagonist should exact of us an implicite faith of that Position. It ill becomes his generosity so basely to beg the question. Let him prove that, and I will be his Proselyte as to antipredetermination of such actions. But because he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypothesis, I will perform mine to my own anon.

2. Mr. *H.* denies the consequence by an argument *a pari*; *That we our selves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others, yet it doth not follow, that because we may afford our leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, that therefore we may afford it to those that are down-right evil; because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing,*

and

and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto. Ibid. & p. 34.

Repl. 1. In general 'tis unsafe arguing *a pari*, from the creature to God; that what the former may not do, neither may the latter. The creature is bound to hinder all the sin that he can; but if God were under such an obligation, there would not only have been so much sin as the world affords, but indeed none at all. And you your self discourse at large of the *incongruity of an universal determinative influence to good actions*; which yet would have made an admirable Metamorphosis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints; (at least if in those expressions you include, *infusion of grace*, which *divine Predetermination* of good actions presupposes, as I have proved before.)

2. If your arguing be forcible as to this instance, I see not, but you reflect as highly upon God by the *immediate concurrence* you grant *to all actions of the Creatures*, Post. p. 28. For will it not follow, that God affords men a leading concurrence to actions down-right evil, and then ruins them for those actions, which were as much his as theirs? I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate your self, but by eating your words, and distinguishing of concurrence, as you do of Predetermination; that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly good

good, but not to those that are down-right evil.

3. Mr. *H*'s answer touches not the intendment of Mr. *Gale*'s argument, which is to evince upon Mr. H's own assertion, that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good; so by the like reason he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil. And the ground of the consequence is this, that if in actions imperfectly good, the evil and the good of the actions are so divided between the creature and God, that only the former is the Creatures, and the latter Gods; whilst yet the natural actions themselves are common to both, to God as the first, to the Creature as the second cause; why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil, the action is common to God and the Creature, but the evil of it, the Creatures peculiar, and no more chargeable upon God, than in the other instance. And this I take for an irrefragable Argument, *ad hominem*, which if Mr. *H*. can satisfie, I am silenced.

4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to salve his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of Judgment) to produce *cursing* and *swearing* for instances of *actions down-right*, or *for the substance of them evil*. I thought that *Davids* frequent *cursing* of wicked men in the *Psalms*, and

Pauls

Pauls swearing, Before God I lye not, Gal. 1. 20. had not passed under so bad a character; but did rest assured, that (as the actions in themselves are capable, so in them) they were hallowed by their manner and end.

5. To what end Mr. *Howe* closes with this clause, '*And then ruine men for the actions we have induced them to*, is not hard to conjecture (*viz.*) to insinuate, that our Doctrine represents God under the same character with the Devil, who induces men to sin, and then torments them for it. But what is said untruly (as well as Prophanely) of the Devil, is verified of our Doctrine, *That it is not so black as it is painted*. Mr. *Howe* indeed tells Mr. *Gale*, you'l say *God may rather*, and adds as his own sense, *But sure he can do so much less than you*, p. 34. This suggestion deserves a severer animadversion than I shall make upon it. In general, I say 'tis *an odious slander*. For we in no sense assert that God induces men to wicked actions, not *morally*, for we constantly affirm, that his commands, threats, are all against it; not *Physically*, for so he determines men to actions, not to the wickedness of them, nor does he ruine men for what he contributes by Predetermination, or immediate concurrence to the Production of (*viz.*) the natural

actions

actions he moves to and joins in.

Answ. 3. Mr. *Howe* denies the consequence from the evidence of two Scriptures compared, *Luk.* 6. 9. *Hos.* 13.6.p. 35. but (which is strange) hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. *Gale's* consequence, or how they shew a difference between the warrantableness of Gods concurring to the *substrate matter of an action as good, which tends to mans salvation and blessedness, and to the substrate matter of all their evil actions* [*which tend to their ruine and misery*]; we must therefore guess at it as well as we can.

Reply. The former Scripture hath these words, *Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good or to do evil, to save life or to destroy?* The latter these, *O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help:* From the former Scripture, I presume, thus he argues: If it be unlawful to man to destroy life, then it is unlawful to God. But the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. And he proves the consequence by the latter Scripture, by this Enthymeme; Gods word is to help man. *Ergo*, it is unlawful for him to destroy. And this, *viz.* that man destroys himself. *Ergo*, 'tis unlawful for God to destroy him. To which, I return,

1. That the *antecedent* or *minor* of the first

firſt Syllogiſm, is not true univerſally, for for it is not unlawful for man to deſtroy life, *ſe defendendo*, i.e. in ſelf-defence; but it muſt be limited to Homicide or murther, which notes not barely the act of deſtroying life, but involves with it a vitioſity, or that act done in caſes prohibited by the divine Law.

2. Suppoſe it were, yet I deny the conſequence, and you cannot be any whit eaſed or relieved by *the thin Sophiſtry, of only a colluſive ambiguity in the word* [*Lawful,*] which you muſt have recourſe to. For ſuppoſe you take it in the antecedent ſtrictly, and in the conſequent analogically, in the former, for the *declared pleaſure of a ruler to his Subject*; in the latter, for *an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one ſteady tenour*, (which are both your own diſtinctions and explications of the word Law), *Let. p.* 41. yet the conſequence is utterly falſe, becauſe depending upon this falſe ground; that whatever man may not do in regard of Gods Law, God himſelf may not do, becauſe of his own nature, or habitual fixed Principle and Rule of acting after one ſteady nature, (as you ſomething odly deſcribe it). In this ſenſe the ſubtil *Twiſſe* rejects *Zuinglius* maxim, *Quod nobis eſt Lex, Deo eſt ingenium &*

is Gods nature to himself. Though in another sense he admits it, That such obligation, as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it, that Gods nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it. Now then, though it be unlawful to man to kill in such cases as the Law exempts, yet it is not contrary to Gods nature to kill, and so not unlawful to him.

3. To the *Enthymeme*, we deny the connexion, that because in [or from] God is mans help, that therefore it is unlawful for him to destroy, for how then does God own himself the author of all evils of suffering, *Amos* 3. 6, *Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?* And besides, we see not, such is the dimness of our sight, how the consequence would be proved thereby, were the connexion granted.

The proofs subjoined hang together so loosly, that I cannot make sense of them, and therefore will dismiss them.

Your general drift I am aware of, that you deny Predestination to evil actions, though you concede it to good, *because it seems more congruous to the divine goodness to concur* (a term that you will still use, though improper enough, to signifie that divine action, we call Predetermination, as hath been shewn once and again) *to actions that*

have good in them, rather than to theſe that have evil in them, becauſe the one tends to the ſalvation, the other to the deſtruction of man. To which I anſwer: This Argument, if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon *immediate concurrence*, which you grant to all actions, and ſo to ſinful, as upon Predetermination; and whatever anſwer will relieve you, will with the ſame hand eaſe us. I will pauſe a little with the Readers leave, and try my skill what anſwer I can excogitate for Mr. *Howe*, which will not be a common friend to us both, (as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope ſhall remain notwithſtanding this publick conteſt): I have thought out my thoughts, and they afford me but three Anſwers.

1. That immediate concurrence, as to ſinful actions, divides between the action and the ſinfulneſs; ſo that 'tis only the action as ſuch, which is Gods and mans at once: the ſinfulneſs of it is to be attributed to man only. And this diſtinction is an open friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occaſions we pay our reſpects.

2. That if it be granted divine concurrence is as immediate to evil, as to good actions, (ſo as hath been explained); yet that does not neceſſitate or compel the will

to

to any elicite act, [*i.e.* inward acts of willing or nilling]: neither does Predetermination judg it self guilty, as to any such crime; for that does but put the creature upon that action, which is produced by Gods immediate concurrence with it. And but that it waits a fitter time to speak out her mind, she could say, That she conceives not how she can compel the will to any act, without compelling God himself: seeing one and the same act thereof, is as truly Gods as the creatures.

3. If immediate concurrence thinks her self disobliged to satisfie an inquisitive curiosity, as to the *modus* or manner how she joines with the creature in an action, to which sin does necessarily adhere, seeing the thing it self is plain, that so strict is the dependance of the creature upon the Creator, that it cannot act without Gods immediate concurrence: Predetermination claims the same priviledg upon the like ground, that the creature cannot exert its natural powers, till they be applied to action, nor determine it self to action, till it be determined; which determination cannot include a compulsion of the will, (which is the main, if not the only controversie), for if the will act spontaneously, and from precedent deliberation, how is it forced? if it do not, how is it a will, *i.e.* a rational appetite? *Arg.*

Arg. 4. (which is Mr. *Gale*'s ſecond) is, *There is no action ſo ſinful, that it hath not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate of it*, Poſtſc. p. 36.

Anſw. 1. To which Argument, propoſed by way of Queſtion, Mr. *Howe* anſwers, *True.*

Reply. But then, if that be true, your former poſition, that *ſome actions are evil in the ſubſtance of them*, p. 33. muſt needs be falſe. Let us but formalize the Oppoſition thus: *ſome actions are ſo ſinful that they have no natural good, as the ſubſtrate matter of them*; [which is the ſenſe of the words juſt now quoted] *no actions are ſo ſinful that they have not ſome natural good, as the ſubſtrate matter of them*; and it will appear, that they are propoſitions contradictory, and conſequently, that they cannot both be true. They are two known Rules in Logick, *contradictio eſt oppoſitio inter univerſalem & particularem Enunciationem* [*aut propoſitionem*] And, *Harum alterutra ſemper vera, & altera ſemper falſa.*

Anſw. 2. Mr. *Howe* preſently flinches, and Sophiſter-like, puts more into the concluſion, than was in the premiſes. And *what muſt be inferr'd* (ſays he) *viz.* from his own conceſſion, *That therefore God muſt by a determinative influence produce every ſuch action* [*what-ever reaſon there be againſt it*].

Reply. Thoſe words included in the ſemiquadrates are injuriouſly foiſted in. For Mr. *Gale*'s Argument entirely is thus, *If there be no action ſo ſinful, that it hath not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate of it, then God is the cauſe*, (viz. by Predetermination) *of that natural good that is in every action, ſed verum prius; Ergo & Poſterius.* And indeed the Argument it ſelf excludes any ſuch addition. For there can be no reaſon againſt Gods production of what is good in any action, unleſs it be (what Mr. *Howe* objects) the accidental adherence of evil thereunto; which, if it be of any moment, militates as much againſt immediate concurrence, (as hath been ſhown but now). That paſſage of *Auſtins*, opportunely offers its ſervice to us, as to the force of Mr. *Gale*'s Argument, *Deus boni tantummodo cauſa eſt*, &c. *i. e. God is only the cauſe of good, therefore he is not the Author of evil; becauſe he is the Author of all things that are, which are ſo far good as they are.* 'Tis indeed Mr. *Gale*'s Argument in other terms.

Anſw. 3. Mr. *Howe* pretends, Mr. *Gale* might better argue from his premiſes, *The neceſſity of his producing every hour a new world; in which, there would be a great deal more of poſitive entity and natural goodneſs*, Poſtſc. p. 36.

Reply.

Reply. This is too great a ſcorn to be caſt upon ſo learned a man, as Mr. *Gale* is well known to be. For there is no *medium* that can, with the leaſt probability, be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. *Gales* Antecedent, and Mr. *Howes* conſequent together. To be ſure, not that which he ſuggeſts; for that is falſe and unworthy of a Philoſopher, at leaſt if theſe maxims be true, *ſubſtantia non recipit magis & minus*; *ens & bonum convertibile*; though 'tis eaſie to conceive there would be more poſitive Beings in number, upon Mr. *Howe's* ſuppoſition, yet 'tis hard to conceive there would be a great deal more of poſitive entity, and ſo of natural goodneſs in the new world, than is already in the old one.

Anſw. 4. *The natural goodneſs that is in the Entity of an action, is no ſuch invitation to the Holy God, by determinative influence to produce it, as that he ſhould offer violence to his own nature, and ſtain the juſtice and honour of his government, by making it to be done, and then puniſh it, being done*, p. 36.

Reply. 1. The natural goodneſs of an action, hath invitation enough in it to induce God to produce it, both becauſe it is good, and becauſe it cannot be done without him.

2. By

2. By Mr. *Howe*'s own conceſſion, ſomething or other does induce God to produce it, by giving and conſerving the powers, and immediate concurrence to the act of thoſe powers.

3. It remains upon Mr. *Howe* to prove, that the producing of an action by determinative influence, is more liable to thoſe abſurdities he names, than the producing it any other way, (except what *Durandus* pitches upon; which if he will alſo own, then I know what I have to rejoyn). In the interim, I am aſhamed he ſhould clog his Reader with, *crambe bis cocta, coleworts twice ſod*; I mean, an odious conſequence impoſed upon *predeterminative influence*, that *it offers violence to Gods nature, and ſtains the juſtice and honour of his Government*; which we ſhall deny, till he hath proved, that by it God makes an action to be done, *i.e.* in his ſenſe neceſſitates it to be done, and then puniſhes it being done; which laſt clauſe is very abſurd in its connexion, for it ſuppoſes a contradiction, *viz.* that the action is naturally good, and yet, that God puniſhes the natural goodneſs in it.

Arg. 5. (which is Mr. *Gale*'s third and laſt). *The denial of Predetermination, even of ſinful actions as ſuch, cuts off the moſt illuſtrious part of divine providence in governing*

governing the lower world, Postsc. p. 33.

Answ. *I am ashamed to answer it. Name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can*, ibid. So Mr. *Howe*.

Reply. 1. This act of providence thereby you deny, which in words you own, to *limit* and *moderate sinful actions*, Postsc. p. 45. This will appear by considering what influence your mediate or immediate concurrence (for you do so fluctuate, that I know not which of the two you will abide by), can have upon this effect. *The mediate* can have none, for that is nothing else but a conservation of the being, with its powers and faculties, and so but abusively called *concurrence* or *concourse*; and so does but keep the powers indeterminate, not determine, nor limit their acts: nor yet can *immediate* limit any action, because as such, it is neither before nor after the creatures action, but with it. The withdrawing of concourse immediate, may hinder, I grant, the creatures action: but whether God does ever withdraw it or no, *Strangius*. L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts, and so may you, perhaps, upon his ground. Let us, for the exemplification of this limitation, consider it, with respect to those things which it is conversant about.

1. As to the *objects of its acts*; as, that *Absaloms* Adultery with *Davids* wifes, ra-

ther than any other women. This is plain, by comparing 2 *Sam.* 12. 11. with *Chap.* 16. 22. In the former place, the words are, *Thus ſaith the Lord, Behold, I will raiſe up evil againſt thee out of thine own houſe: and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he ſhall lye with thy wives in the ſight of the Sun.* In the latter place the event anſwers the threat. *And Abſalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of all Iſrael.*

2. As *to the time, when,* or *how long* the ſinful acts ſhall be exerciſed about their objects. *When,* Gen. 45. 5, *God did ſend me before you to preſerve life,* ſays *Joſeph* to his Brethren; whereas, they might not have ſold him, till the famine came. *How long*; That is intimated in *Pſal.* 125. 3, *The rod of the wicked ſhall not reſt upon the lot of the Righteous.*

3. As *to the event,* or iſſue of the actions. That an oppreſſour ſhall impoveriſh, not utterly undo him he does oppreſs: that he who ſtrikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him, ſhall yet but wound him.

4. *As to the decree of the act,* Pſal. 76. 10, *Surely the wrath of man ſhall praiſe thee; the remainder of wrath thou ſhalt reſtrain,* תחגיר, *cinges, ligabis*; which I underſtand

derſtand of binding up the faculty, that it put not forth its utmoſt force in the act iſſuing from it: as when a man is but in a pet, as we ſay, not outragiouſly angry. Thus God makes as great a difference between the ſame man and himſelf, as a Rider does when he uſes a ſtrait rein, or lays the bridle on his Horſes neck.

2. The over-ruling and diſpoſing of a ſinful action to good, againſt the deſign and inclination of the ſinful Agent, *Poſtſc.* p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence, which Mr *Howe* denies, in the denial of Predetermination. For *immediate concurrence* is all that Mr. *Howe* allows of; which, being but Gods action with the creature, and not exiſtent before nor after it, cannot therefore direct the action to any end. And particularly in puniſhing one ſin with another. As in the inſtance of *Abſalom*; his Adultery with his Fathers Concubines, was a puniſhment of *Davids* Adultery with *Uriah*'s Wife. In this and ſuch like inſtances, God is the Author, *ordinis in malo*, though not *mali*, (as the moſt learned Dr. *Field*, Dean of of *Glouceſter*, expreſſes it, of the Church, p. 131, 132). *i. e. God is the Author of the order of conſequence, that one evil ſhall follow another, and have the reaſon of a puniſhment thereof*; which how he can be, is no way explicable, but

by the Doctrine of *Predetermination* which, importing an application of the creature to action, and to one rather than another, and at one time rather than another, *&c.* (as hath been shown) gives an easie account, how God may dispose of sinful actions to good ends, and particularly to this, to be punishments of preceding sins.

And now, it is high time that we take a view of Mr. *Howe's* Arguments, for the negative of the Question hitherto discussed, for which we must return to his Letter again, where he states the *Thesis* he opposes, as importing *an irresistible predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the creature, even to those that are in themselves most malignantly wicked*, Let. p. 32.

Reply. Here are divers ambiguities in the terms (besides that of predeterminative concurrence, which hath been faulted already, as not very proper).

1. The term *irresistible*; which may either import, *a necessity of infallibility*, as to the event, or a *necessity of coaction* or compulsion. If he takes it in the former sense, 'tis altogether improperly. For irresistible, imports a relation of the action of the agent, to some resistance or counteraction of the patient; as when the water endeavours to put out the fire, which would

would lick it up; or in free agents, when a man with all his ſtrength reſiſts him that by force would carry him away Priſoner. If he underſtands the term in the latter and proper ſenſe, I underſtand not why he impoſes the term upon our Theſis; for we do not aſſert any compulſion in Predetermination of the will, nor can we conceive it poſſible in any caſe; not if we ſhould ſuppoſe *per impoſsibile*, a rational creature made under no Law at all; for then as it would have a power, and alſo an inclination to uſe it, ſo there would be no need of any force to reduce it to act; not ſuppoſing it (as it is) under a Law, would there be any need of compulſion, not as to good actions, becauſe there are gracious habits to diſpoſe the will to actions congenerous; not as to evil actions, (no not if God did predetermine to them as ſuch) for the will in regard of ſinful habits is of it ſelf inclined enough to any evil actions.

2. The *term*, in themſelves moſt malignantly wicked. To which I ſay, that it may be underſtood in a double ſenſe, either with reſpect, *to the different kind of Laws* that prohibit actions, thus; Thoſe actions are ſaid to be in themſelves evil which are a breach of the *Law of nature*, and ſo are oppoſed to thoſe which are evil only by a *poſitive law*; or elſe with reference *to the degrees of rectitude*

tude in one and the same Law; thus some actions are said to be in themselves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, as that is opposed to the end and circumstances. Thus the hatred of God, and Adultery, are in themselves evil, because no end or circumstance can make them good; but giving Alms out of vain glory is not in it self evil, because changing the end, the action is good, that before was bad.

But Mr. *H.* understands the term in another sense, and overlooks the genuine signification of it; *viz.* thus, that *wickedness is of the essence of some actions.* This I collect from that clause, *Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, than to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsecally evil action*, Let. p. 33. Now 'tis plain enough, if we take *the hatred of God*, which is Mr. *H.*'s instance of an action in it self evil, that the evil of that action is separable from it, for the same passion, if the Devil be the object of it, is good. And the evil of this action is as separable from it, as in actions that are evil, as to their circumstances. As to read the Scriptures, when it is our present duty to hearken to the Sermon. The reason is the same in both, the action of hatred is evil only in regard of the undue object, and the action of reading the Scriptures only in regard of the undue circum-

cumſtance of time. And if Mr. *H.* underſtands *actions in themſelves evil, of actions eſſentially evil*, let him enjoy his own ſatisfaction, but let him not impoſe it upon us, who look upon it as one of the greateſt abſurdities a learned man can be guilty of believing. To ſtate the Queſtion therefore aright (though we have done it before) we ſay, that we reject the term *irreſiſtible*, as not being in the Queſtion, but being a begging of the Queſtion, becauſe it ſuppoſes ſome force on Gods part the Agent, which the Creature as far as it can reſiſts. And we diſown the *diſtinction of actions*, which Mr. *H.* introduces into the Queſtion, for we know of none that are *in themſelves malignantly wicked*; that is (in his ſenſe) *eſſentially evil*. But that which we aſſert is, That God does predetermine the Creature as well to the actions that are evil, as to thoſe that are good. Let us now hear his Arguments againſt our Aſſertion.

Arg. 1. *If there be an irreſiſtible determinative concurrence to all, and ſo to wicked actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all wicked actions was a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility.* But the Antecedent is, Therefore we muſt own the conſequent, *Let. p.* 32.

Anſ. 1. In general, If we take his words ſimply as they ſound, we ſee not but we may grant

grant the whole, with as little inconvenience to our assertion as to his. For the consequence will be the same, if some of his assertions be placed for an Antecedent in the room of ours. If God does certainly foreknow all, and so all wicked actions of the Creature, then for the Creature not to do those wicked actions, was *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*. For 'tis as truly impossible that events should not be such as God foreknows they will be; as that men should yield obedience to the Laws of God, when God hinders them *thorugh his own irresistible counteraction*, Mr. *H*'s phrase *p.* 37. Again, we may argue thus, If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all good actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all good actions was *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*; *i.e.* it is simply impossible, that good men should not do those good actions, exacted of them by the Law. As to this last, I cannot apprehend any reason why Predeterminative concurrence to evil actions should make the avoiding of them impossible; and the like concurrence to good actions should leave the neglect of them possible.

2. But because Mr. *H.* intends more by *Impossibility* than the Predeterminants can allow him, we shall borrow a little learning from

from the Schools for the explication of it. It is a Queſtion in Metaphyſicks, *An poſſibile & contingens a parte rei æquipolleant*; i.e. *Whether for a thing to be poſſible and contingent, are of the ſame ſignification or import?* To which it is anſwered affirmatively, *Si poſſibile accipiatur pro eo quod ſeſe habet indifferenter ut ſit*; i.e. *If for a thing to be poſsible be taken for an indifferency to be or not to be.* And by the like reaſon *impoſsible* and *neceſſary* muſt be terms equipollent, if *impoſsible* be taken *for that which is not indifferent to be, and not to be*; *or, which as it is not, ſo nor can it be.* 'Tis true indeed, that Impoſſible is contrary to Neceſſary; as Neceſſary is taken generally for that which cannot but be, and Impoſſible for that which cannot be: yet theſe two are equipollent, if the one be affirmed, the other denied; for that which is neceſſary to be, is impoſſible not to be; and that which is neceſſary not to be, is impoſſible to be; and on the other hand, That which is impoſſible to be, is neceſſary not to be; and that which is impoſſible not to be, is neceſſary to be. We muſt therefore make a little enquiry into the kinds of *neceſsity*, which as to things is either *ſimple*, or *compound*. The latter (for the former is irrelative to our buſineſs) agrees to things in their coheſion or connexion each with other; this

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is divided into a *neceſsity of the conſequent*, and of *conſequence*, or *abſolute*, and *reſpective*. The former is a connexion of thoſe things which cannot be ſever'd without a contradiction; *i.e.* deſtroying the nature of their ſubject. So juſtice to God, reaſon to man, agree ſo neceſſarily to their ſubjects, that if you deny either, you do in effect deny them to be what they are, The latter, a neceſſity whereby thoſe things that are not in their own nature conjoined, are yet upon ſuppoſition of ſomething antecedent conjoined for this or that time. Whence *Baronius* calls the former, *a neceſsity of nature*; the latter, *an accidental neceſsity*. Of this latter ſort is this example, If Iſlanders will export Goods out of their own Country, they muſt make uſe of Ships. And from theſe modes of neceſſity it is eaſie to collect the modes of Impoſſibility, That ſomething is ſaid to be impoſſible, either *abſolutely*, which involves a contradiction, as for a ſtone to be a man; or *reſpectively*, as if a man will fly that he ſhould have wings. And here we may ſtop a while and obſerve how Mr. *H.* hath *gratified his own unſcholaſtick humour*, in neglecting the ſtrictneſs of Scholaſtick terms, to the overthrow of his own aſſertion. For I am much miſtaken if it is not plain enough that Mr. *H.* confounds the diſtinction of *neceſsity* or *impoſsibility*, into *abſolute* and *reſpective*; and

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makes the matter of Gods Laws, *&c.* upon ſuppoſition of Gods irreſiſtible determination to wicked actions, to be an *impoſſibility* of both kinds, and ſo of neither. For if it be an impoſſibility only upon Hypotheſis of Determinative influence, how is it a *ſimple and ſtrictly natural impoſſibility*? If it be a *ſimple*, &c. *impoſſibility*, how is it an impoſſibility only upon an Hypotheſis? [*viz.* that now mentioned.]

Way being thus made by explication of the Terms, to the antecedent or minor, I anſwer by denial, That the Determinative Influence to all wicked actions we aſſert, does infer any coaction on the Will.

Arg. If Determination of the Will imports Coaction, or is inconſiſtent with the freedom of the Will; then it is either from ſome general reaſon agreeing to all Determination, or from ſome ſpecial reaſon agreeing only to this Determination, *viz.* to ſinful actions; but neither of theſe: *Ergo*, it does not import any ſuch thing at all; no Determination of the Will in general does import Coaction, or deſtroy its liberty.

1. Upon Mr. *H*'s own conceſſion of a *Predetermination of good actions*, Poſt. p. 39. which I preſume he will not affirm to be *compulſory*; yet becauſe I cannot ſee a reaſon why he ſhould not, (as well as of evil actions) I will ſuppoſe him to acknowledg

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it. And then I would demand whether God compels men to the natural actions as such, or to them as morally good. Not to the natural actions as such, but to them there is no need of it, *for the powers that produce them, are apt and habile for any congenerous action*, by Mr. *H*'s confession, *Post. p.* 45. Not to the actions as good, for the powers being renewed by Grace, (so far as they are such) need but an excitation, not a compulsion.

2. It appears from the general principle of Divines, *Libertas a coactione est essentialis voluntatis proprietas*; i.e. *That liberty from force and compulsion is an essential property of the will.* Which may be thus evinced. 1. By the nature of the wills liberty, that it is τὸ ἑκούσιον νοητικὸν, *spontaneum intellectuale*; i.e. *spontaneum præeunte intellectus lumine vel judicio*, as *Strang.* acknowledges, *De Vol. Dei, p.* 686. That is, *an Intellectual spontaneity.* A *spontaneity* in opposition to the acting of necessary agents, such as the Sun in shining; and *Intellectual*, to distinguish it from that spontaneity which agrees to brutes, or to mankind, who are acted by fancy, without previous judgment, as Infants, Fools, Mad-men, who whilest they remain such, are brutes in the shape of men and women.

2. It appears by the repugnancy of the terms

terms in conjunction. For the Will to be forced is but *invita aliquid velle*, i. e. *to will any thing unwillingly*; which were to will and not will the same object at the same time, which is an implicit contradiction.

2. 'Tis not from any peculiar reason agreeing to sinful actions. If there be any, Mr. *H.* would befriend the world to bring it to light. Which will appear,

1. Upon Mr. *H*'s grounds, if Coaction be inseparable from compulsion, upon any special reason agreeing to one sort of actions, rather than another, it must be with respect to good actions, not to evil. For God determines the Will by *irresistible grace*, to such actions as by nature since the fall it is averse unto; and remains so in a degree after the blessed change it hath undergone: whereas the Will having a natural Bias to evil, [as it is not, so nor] does it need to be predetermined, *i.e.* forced, [if Mr. *Howe* be a faithful interpreter of the word.]

2. There are manifest indications of liberty in sinful actions, pregnant proofs that man hath not only *potentiam in se liberam*, but *liberum usum potentiæ*; i.e. *a power in it self free, but as to them a free use of his power.* An instance of his own, *hatred of God*, will serve our turn. This act must be *spontaneous*, or 'tis not the act of an humane will,

which is an [intellectual] *appetite*; no, nor of a ſenſitive appetite, for to this laſt ſpontaneity is eſſential, and *intellectual* too: and ſo it is, for it proceeds from, and is guided by a precedent [though miſtaken] judgment of the underſtanding, which repreſents God to him as a Tyrant, that abuſes his authority by needleſs reſtraints upon mans natural inclinations. Suppoſe to unchaſtity with any woman whoſe skin and features attract his liking. *Joſeph*'s Brethrens hatred of him, was determined by God to the ſelling, rather than killing of him; yet as they acted ſpontaneouſly, ſo upon precedent conſideration. Two Reaſons determined their choice of the milder courſe of the two they had in view, *He is our Brother, and our Fleſh, and what profit is it if we ſlay him, and conceal his blood?* Gen. 37. 26.

3. If there be any reaſon to infer Coaction from Predetermination, it muſt be the inconſiſtency of neceſſity on Gods part, and contingency on mans: Which if it be univerſally affirmed,

1. Then I know not how Mr. *Howe* will ſalve the objection againſt *immediate concurrence*, [which he ſeems to grant,] *that thereby the liberty of the will ſeems to be loſt, both as to the exerciſe and ſpecification of the act.* Unleſs as *Burgeſdicius* does, (whoſe ſolution offers it ſervice, he being the firſt Metaphyſick

sick Author that ever I read,) *That the concourse of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions, because it does not precede the action of the second cause.* Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reason (if assented to) will give a mortal wound to the Predestination (which certainly precedes them) of good actions, which Mr. *H.* acknowledges: or if he will loose the knot artificially, he must say that the concourse of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting, that notwithstanding it, natural causes act necessarily, and voluntary causes contingently, or freely; and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions.

2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general, will bear as hard upon (what we grant, and Mr. *H.* cannot deny) *actions in themselves good*, as *Amor Dei*, the love of God; as it can do upon (what we deny, and you assert) *actions in themselves evil*, as *odium Dei*, the hatred of God. And harder, for the Will is but in part free to good actions, when as 'tis wholly free, I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions. We are now the better prepared by way thus made, to answer Mr. *H*'s proofs of his consequence. Which are,

1. *Not to do an action whereto the agent*

is determined by an infinite power is impossible, Let. p. 33. *Ergo*, not to do wicked actions, [for that's the sum of his consequent, in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof] to which the creature is determined is impossible.

Rep. 1. In general, that [supposing his Antecedent true, as 'tis in the sense before given] yet the impossibility he speaks of is not *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*, which he before asserted; but an *impossibility respective*, to the determination of an infinite power, (as hath been proved.)

R. 2. That if he intends a *respective or conditional impossibility*, I grant his Enthymeme, for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his, viz. *of determination to good actions*. For all determination does infer a necessity, that the thing determined should be, as it is determined to be; or an impossibility, that the thing determined should not be, as it is determined to be.

Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hypoth. major, the term *irresistibly* to modifie the *determination* he opposes, and we must understand by it *compulsion* or *force*, we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us. And so we may rid our hands of it, as an ignoble begging of the Question, for that was incumbent on him

him to prove, not to take for granted, that our Predetermination imports a Co-action.

Mr. *H*'s second Enthymeme is this, *To separate the malignity of an action intrinsecally evil is impossible*, p. 33. *Ergo*, not to do such wicked actions to which the creature is determined, is impossible.

Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments sake, I cannot imagine how he will defend the *immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures*; and so to sinful actions, and so to those (if there be any such) as are in themselves evil, against the charge of involving God in the production of sinful actions, as such, seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinsecally evil action is as much Gods as mans action. *Baronius* and *Strangius* (who are as Heterodox as Mr. *H.*) do both confess, that *it is very hard to shew how God may be freed from that charge, when-as he co-operates with the creature to every sinful action. Bar. Met.* 98. *D.* 3. *n.* 72. *Strang. de Vol. Dei. p.* 344, 372. Though Mr. *H.* would lay the *great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd upon our Religion*, only upon *Predeterminative concourse to wicked actions*. Yet, the Learned *Amesius*, a Predeterminant, tells us not without reason, *Deformitas moralis magis annexa videtur actui in exercito, quam*

in applicatione ad agendum. Cont. Grev. p. 189. i. e. *Moral deformity ſeems more cloſely joined to action, than to application unto action.* For an object may be innocently preſented to the eye, which may put a man upon action, *viz.* unchaſt deſires.

Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent, *ex animo*, becauſe it does implicate, that there ſhould be any ſuch action. 'Tis a received maxim, *Malum eſt in bono, tanquam in ſubjecto*, i.e. *Evil is in good, as in its ſubject.* And *Auguſtine*'s ſaying is well known, and as well approved, *Ipſum quantulum-cunque eſſe bonum eſt, quia ſummum eſſe bonum eſt.* De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. *Being it ſelf how inconſiderable ſoever is good, becauſe the chiefeſt Being is good.*

R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a ſeparation of an action from the evil of it. Of this ſeparation there are many inſtances: ſuppoſing Uſury lawful, (which I will not now diſpute) I may lawfully take up money at uſe at Ten pounds *per Cent.* (if my neceſsity require it) when the Intereſt allowed by Law (which to break in matters of publick benefit is ſinful) is but 6*l.* A Chriſtian Prince may urge the great *Turk* to ſwear to Articles of Peace, though the former knows the latter will ſwear by his *Mahomet.* Theſe are inſtan-

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ces of *our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind*, [than God does concur to the actions of his creature] as Mr. *H.* ſpeaks in another caſe, *Poſt. p.* 33. And by the like reaſon may God *Predeterminatively concur* (as Mr. *H.* delights to ſpeak, though not accurately) to an action that is evil, and yet not to the evil of it; which the Learned *Twiſſe* illuſtrates by divers pretty ſimilitudes. *An Horſeman that puts on a lame horſe to go, is the cauſe of his motion, not of his halting, that proceeds from ſome hurt in his leg, the inſtrument of motion. The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill ſtink, of which ſtink that that warmth is not the cauſe appears, in that the very ſame influence draws forth a fragrant ſavour from a bed of Roſes. That the dunghill ſmells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapours, but that it ſmells ill is from the condition of the matter. The upper-wheel of a Clock, though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel, that is irregular in its motion, yet it is not the cauſe of that irregularity. When a dexterous Penman writes upon ſinking paper he makes* [pothooks, as we ſay of children that begin to learn the art of writing] *blots rather than letters, which yet is not his fault, but the Papers.* Twiſſe Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1a, p. 26.

Reply. 4. There must needs be a separation [and therefore 'tis possible to be] between actions, and the evil of them upon Mr. *Howe*'s own Hypothesis (*viz.*) *That God does predetermine to all good actions*, which in the present state are but imperfectly good. Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man, as to the same action, and ascribe the action and grace of it to God, and the evil that adheres to that action to man, unless he will ascribe all to God. *Absit blasphemia verbo!* If Mr. *Howe* can extricate himself, and not us with the same Answer; or rather, if he can excogitate any other Answer, than by this exsibilated distinction—*erit mihi magnus Apollo*, and without an Irony, *sapientum octavus*.

Reply. 2. To the *connexion*. I Answer, That it infolds a twofold contradiction.

1. For it supposes some actions to be *intrinsecally evil*, and yet (by our Hypothesis), to be *determined*, i. e. *compell'd*, (if Mr. *Howe* may be admitted our Interpreter); whereas, that is not sin which is not *spontaneous*, neither is that *spontaneous* which is *necessary*, i. e. *violent* [or compell'd]. For *violence is a Physical action upon the Patient; in which sort of actions vertue or vice hath no place: for the will is the principle of moral actions*. So the learned *Came-*

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ro de *Scand.* p. 98. [where note, that I presume *Camero* denies not original sin imputed, to be *suo modo*, i. e. *in its kind voluntary*, [and so truly sin], according to St. *Austins* sentiments, *nos omnes eramus ille unus homo*, i. e. *we were all that one man*, [*Adam*], and so sinned in him. This to prevent any misapprehension].

2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause, whereas 'tis a known Rule in Divinity, *Peccatum qua tale & essentialiter est effectus moralis, & non habet causam Physicam*, i. e. *Sin as such, and essentially is a moral effect, and hath no Physical cause.*

Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. *Howe's Antecedent*, and *Connexion*, we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis, by proving, that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves; or that no moral evil is positive, but only privative, (which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines, in enquiring into the nature of moral evil). And I shall borrow one Argument, which will be instead of all, from the most learned Dr. *Barlow*, the now Renowned Bishop of *Lincoln*.

Arg. *Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being. But moral evil* [*formally*] *taken, is not from God the author and first cause of all Being.*

Ergo,

Ergo, *moral evil* [*formally taken*] *is not a real and positive Being.*

The *Minor is evident, and acknowledged by the very Heathens, in the appellation of* Optimus, *the Best, which they apply to their* Jupiter, *together with* Maximus *the Greatest:* [And will no doubt be owned by Mr. *Howe*; who, *eo nomine*, for that very reason, rejects Predestination of evil actions, because, in his apprehension, it makes God the author of moral evil].

The *Major*, let us hear the learned Bishop prove, [and the rather, because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such].

Proof. *Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being, which does not depend, and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being,* [viz. God]; *for it must needs be, if there be any Being not caused by God, that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause; and consequently, God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being, whence follow many absurdities,* &c. [whereof I shall only take the sum, as himself hath given it us, with an application to moral evil]. *If moral evil,* [i.e. *any sin or breach of Divine Law*], *be a real Being; then,* 1. *God shall not be the cause of that Being; for of so deformed a birth, divine goodness cannot be the Parent,*

rent. 2. *This granted, it will follow,* 1. *That there is a ſecondary Being, and a Being by participation,* [*ſuch as every finite Being is ſuppoſed to be*]; *which does not partake of* [*or receive its*] *being from the firſt Being.* 2. *That there is a finite Being independent upon God, both as to production and conſervation.* *All which things we know, and believe are contrary, not only to Philoſophy, but Divinity.* Thus far the moſt acute Philoſopher and Divine, *Exercit. metaph.* 2*a. de natura mali, ad calcem Scheib. met.* p. 32, 33.

Let us take notice of the inſtances of thoſe ſins, which are ſuppoſed to be evil in themſelves, [or poſitive].

Obj. 1. Sins of commiſſion which are evil, *ex genere & objecto*; (whereof two are ſpecially inſiſted on: *Adams eating of the forbidden fruit*, and [by Mr. *Howe*] *the hatred of God*) are in themſelves evil.

Anſw. 1. In general. *If all ſins ſubſiſt in ſome actual motion of the ſoul, body, or both, and this motion abſtractively conſidered, be the material part of every actual ſin, and hath God for the prime cauſe, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; then no ſin can be aſſigned, wherein this material part may not be found.* So the Learned *Davenant*, ſometime Biſhop of *Sariſbury*, *Animadv.* on *Hoard*, p. 174, 175.

Anſw. 2.

Answ. 2. As to the instances. The first, *in eating the forbidden fruit, the material part of the sin, in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the mastication* [chewing] *and manducation* [eating], *and other bodily acts. Separate these from the formal part, which is* modus appetendi, *the manner of desiring, and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command, and God was the prime author thereof. The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the defective will of man,* Davenant. ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance, *hatred of God*; That the act terminated upon that object, *in complexo*, is evil, and cannot be otherwise, we deny not; but then, that is true of *acts and undue ends*, as Hospitality out of vain-glory; of *acts and undue circumstances*, as walking in the Fields, when we should be at Church; as of *acts and undue objects*, whereof this is an instance. And so all sinful actions are evil, as to their substance, which Mr. *Howe* hath not affirmed. That hatred of God is not evil in it self, *because the act invaried, the object but changed, that act which was evil,*

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is become morally good. So our Learned Biſhop of *Lincoln*, again, *Exerc. met.* p. 41. which he illuſtrates and proves by the inſtance of *Adultery*, *where the act being the ſame for the ſubſtance, is altered in its moral reſpect, by making the woman, with whom I committed Adultery, my wife*, Id. ibid. Which inſtance of our Learned Biſhop is plain in the caſe of *David* and *Bathſheba*, whoſe ſociety together was unlawful before, but lawful after their marriage. They that deſire further ſatisfaction in this point, may do well to have recourſe to a learned Diſcourſe in our native Language, of Mr. *H. Hickman, of the poſitivity of ſin.*

Obj. 2. One ſin is the cauſe of another, as original ſin inherent [as that ſtands oppoſed to original ſin imputed] is the cauſe of actual ſins; therefore ſin is not meerly privative.

Sol. *The privation which is in the natural propenſion of the will to ſin,* [*in which natural propenſion original ſin conſiſts*], *is not the real efficient of evil actions; but the will, in regard of that propenſion, is the real and true cauſe of evil actions.* So *Baron. met.* §. 5. *n.* 30. & 33.

Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a poſitive part in original ſin.

Sol. Yet they hold ſin to be *only Privative.* But then it will be demanded how their

their assertions will agree together.

I Answer, In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Quality. This latter Divines call a want of original righteousness, or *not to be able to do good.* The former, they call a pravity of nature, or *to be able to do evil* only, which is called *Positive Logice*, because 'tis expressed affirmatively; whereas the latter is expressed negatively: so *Maccov. op.* Post. p. 83. [r. *fuse de hac re disserentem* Gisb. Voet. Disp. Theol. p. 1. p. 1084.

Arg. 2. *If God hath a predeterminative concurrence to the most wicked actions, it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions, is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best; wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the malicious Tempter, who prompts to them, or to the actor that doth them, or wherein not a great deal more?* Let. p. 32, 33. which Argument Mr. *Howe* gives us more concisely afterward, *That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as to the best; as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter*, Postsc. p. 25. [*viz.* according to our Doctrine].

Answ. 1. If our learned Adversary understands the *antecedent*, as we do whom he

he oppoſes, of the *materiale* of wicked actions, we grant his conſequence: for we cannot yet ſee the inconvenience of owning, that there is an univerſal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents, as ſuch, abſtracted from their morality. The actions of the underſtanding and will *Phyſically* conſidered, are neither holy nor ſinful; thoſe denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law preſcribed, as a compliance with, or deviation from it: and therefore, *in linea Phyſica*, Gods influence and concurrence is the ſame, when they are the *ſubſtrate matter of moral evil, and moral good.*

2. If he intends the *formale*, or rather, the moſt wicked actions, *in concreto*, we diſown the *antecedent* as none of ours, and complain of his diſingenuity in pinning ſuch an aſſertion upon our ſleeve.

3. Yet however, for his ſatisfaction, I ſhall let him know, That (beſides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree ſoever, which we acknowledg common to both) there are divers differences of the influence we own for diſtinguiſhing of good actions from bad.

1. That as to good actions God does, *in genere phyſico, re create* thoſe internal habits, which he did *concreate* in the ſtate of innocency, with the ſeveral faculties, in which they were reſpectively ſeated, (as know-

knowledg in the understanding; a rectitude of the will, consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understanding); that they might be [*actus primi*, or] principles of [the *actus secundi*, or] operations of the faculties, [in vertue of those habits], which [faculties] he influences to reduce them to act, by that influence which we call *Predetermination*. But as to evil actions, God infuses no evil, neither indeed can he (besides the repugnancy such an action would carry to his holiness); because, though sin be sometimes conceived by us, *per modum habitus positivi*, under the notion of a positive habit, yet it is not properly so, and so is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency, (which we call *infusion*), as hath been, in part, demonstrated before.

2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them, so excite to the action, as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given, whence those acts immediately proceed; which he does not neither as to evil actions.

3. We have a third difference from Mr. *H*'s own concession: *The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his Word*, viz. *The Precepts, Promises,*

Promiſes, and Comminations, which are th. moral inſtruments of his Government. Poſtſc p. 42. The meaning of which words, is, that God is not only a *Phyſical*, but alſo a *moral cauſe* of good actions: whereas 'tis our ſentiment, that God is only a *Phyſical cauſe* of the actions to which ſin inheres, but not a *moral cauſe* of the ſin adhering to them. And (if I do not too much truſt my own judgment) this obſervation is not contemptible for the evincing of it; that the indifferency of the will to chuſe or refuſe the Object propoſed by the underſtanding, is not ſo natural to the will, but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuſe or refuſe one object rather than another.

As for the compariſon which he makes between *God, the ſinner and the Tempter*, (upon our grounds), and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions, 'tis an *odious and horrible calumny*, not backed with any proof; as he intends it of ſuch actions *in the concrete*, i. e. as including with the action the ſinfulneſs of it too.

Reply. To it I reply, That a *ſhort Horſe is ſoon curried.* This ſlight objection is eaſily anſwered.

1. Either Mr. *Howe* means *as much phyſical influence*, or *moral*: If the former, we ſay *God* and the *ſinner* have both a *phy-*

ſical influence, upon the action that is evil, but the *Tempter* none at all; and that, as to the evil of it, their *phyſical influence* is alike, *i. e.* they have none at all; for ſin not being a *phyſical effect*, cannot have a *phyſical cauſe*. If the latter, (beſides that that influence is not in the Queſtion), the *Sinner* and the *Tempter* have influence and concurrence to wicked actions, and *God* not at all: for neither by Commands, Counſels, Threats, nor Promiſes, does he induce men to ſin.

2. Were it ſo; yet the *immediate concurrence*, which he acknowledges *to all actions*, and ſo to ſinful actions; in conjunction with the notion he entertains with ſelf-applauſe, *of the inſeparableneſs of the evil of ſome actions from the actions themſelves*, makes himſelf obnoxious to the ſame charge of making Gods concurrence with ſinful actions, to be as much or more than the *Sinners*, or the *Tempters*.

Arg. 3. Laſtly, he charges the Predetermination of ſinful actions with *irreconcilableneſs with Gods wiſdom and ſincerity*, &c. *Poſtſc. p.* 25. by which, &c. I preſume he intends, *in his Counſels, Exhortations, and what-ever means he uſes to prevent them*, (which are the expreſſions he uſes in the Title-Page of his Letter, in reference to Preſcience),

Reply.

Reply. As to both of these perfections of God, I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. *Howe*, for the reconcileableness of Gods Prescience with them, which may not by a just proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination. For the evincing whereof, we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs.

1. To speak particularly of *Gods wisdom.*

1. *That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting, we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit*, Let. p. 51.

Reply. The same may be said of Predetermining, and dehorting, though not simply as to the terms, yet as to the things signified by them; for the elicite acts of the will, being the Object of Predetermination, [contested for], we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compell'd; and so as to the event, infers but a *necessity of infallibility*, as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from, (which also Prescience does).

2. Mr. *Howe* goes on, *Let it be supposed only, that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience, we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government? or wer*

it a good consequence, he foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world? Let. p. 54.

Reply. And why may not we as well argue thus, Let it be but supposed only, that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature, we will upon that supposition acknowledg it a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, that by a perfection [that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures, but reduces them to act] he is disabled for government; or were it a good consequence, He is the first cause, [not only of all beings], but of all actions as such, therefore he is unfit to govern the world? And I will add; nay surely, but the more fit in the present state of mankind, [not to intermeddle now with Angels], because all the actions of men, being either in whole or in part sinful, he would have nothing to govern, if he had not the government of all their actions; and govern them he could not, nor limit them, nor turn them to good, if he did not Predetermine them, (as hath been, I trust, clearly evinced).

3. *Would the supposition of such foreknowledg in God make that cease to be mans duty, which had otherwise been so?* Let. p. 54. *for what influence can foreknowledg have to alter or affect any way, either the nature of the*

the thing foreknown, or the Temper of the perſon that ſhall do it, any more than the preſent knowledg of the ſame thing now in doing? P. 55.

Reply. And can Predetermination make that ceaſe to be mans duty, which otherwiſe had been ſo? ſeeing that it alters not the nature of the thing: [the will of man], nor the Temper of the perſon [Predetermin'd]; but as it finds the will free, ſo it leaves it; and as it finds the perſon diſpoſed by habitual inclinations, ſo works upon him; which is confirmed, by that grave obſervation of his, which we embrace as our cordial friend, and confederate. *It were very unreaſonable to imagine, that God cannot in any caſe, extraordinarily overſway the inclinations, and determine the will of ſuch a creature, as over whom Gods general courſe of Government is by moral inſtruments,* [viz. *Man*], *in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let.* p. 141. Only we extend it further, That ſuppoſing, (what hath been before proved), that Predetermination includes a Perfection, God can *in all caſes* determine the will, without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency; for that were to alter the nature of the will, and the temper of the perſon whoſe will it is. And I add, what influence can *fore-determining* have to alter the nature of the thing, or

perſon fore-determined, more than *immediate concurrence* to the ſame action, of the ſame perſon, now in doing?

4. *But if what was otherwiſe mans duty, be ſtill his duty, what can make it unfit, that it be made known and declared to him to be ſo? and how is that otherwiſe to be done, than by theſe diſputed means? yea, (for this is the caſe), what can make it leſs fit, than that God ſhould quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures, upon no other reaſon, than only that he foreſees they have a mind to invade it?* Let. p. 56.

Reply. All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Preſcience, (wherein Mr. *Howe* and we agree): what can make it unfit that God ſhould acquaint man with his duty, by proper means, ſeeing Predetermination ſuppoſes ſuch a foreknowledg (as Mr. *Howe* ſuppoſes, antecedent to Gods decree) of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government, if put under ſuch and ſuch circumſtances; or rather, (becauſe we underſtand not any foreknowledg, but of *Poſſibilium, things poſſible*, not *Futurorum, of things future*, antecedent to Gods decree) ſeeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right, without which he could not will ſo to do, leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action, as

if

if it exerted all its elicite acts, only by a power derived from God, and preserved apt and habile for action.

4. *But it may now be said, All this reasoning,* (says Mr. *Howe*), *tends but to establish this assertion; that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin, it is however necessary he forewarn him of it: but it answers not the objected difficulty,* (viz.) *How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end: as it manifests the end, mans obedience cannot be attained, when it is foreknown he will not obey,* Let. p. 57.

To this difficulty Mr. *Howe* answers, *That there is this noble and important end, which Gods Edicts aim at,* (viz.) *the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it self. And that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and most worthy of himself. And what could be more so, than to testifie his aversion to whatsoever is unholy, his love of righteousness, and complacency to be imitated herein, together with his propension to make them happy, who do imitate him,* p. 61. [I take here but the sum of Mr. *Howe*'s words, because they contain nothing controversal].

Reply. Whether this Discourse affords us any new consideration or no, yet we can claim the benefit of it in the fullest extent of it to Prescience, as to Predetermination also.

2. As to *Gods ſincerity, the difficulty may ſtill urge, how it can ſtand with ſincerity; whereas that end alſo which fails,* [viz. *mans obedient compliance with Gods Declarations of his will,* p. 60.] *ſeems to have been moſt directly intended,* &c. p. 65. To which Mr. *Howe* anſwers.

1. *That the publick Declarations of the Divine will do attain that very end in great part, and as to many, and are the ſucceſsful means of obtaining it,* p. 66.

Reply. And ſo they do upon our Hypotheſis, who acknowledg God firſt infuſes gracious habits into ſome, and then determines the powers in which theſe habits reſide, to congenerous actions; which yet excludes not the uſe of Gods Edicts, as means of educing thoſe actions: *which becauſe they are vital and free paſſing from the Will, upon a compariſon made in the Underſtanding between the Goodneſs of the Objects propoſed to it, do require a moral cauſe, whereby the Agent may both underſtand the Object, and by Arguments be induced to imbrace it,* (as the Learned *Parker* obſerves, *Theſ. de Trad. Pecc. ad vitam Th.* 27.)

2. *Nor was it neceſſary that thoſe who would obey ſhould be ſever'd from the reſt, and be dealt withal apart,* &c. p. 67.

Rep. This we alſo aſſent heartily unto.

3. *Nor was it neceſſary, that effectual*

care

care should be taken that they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person, p. 67.

Rep. Here is a strange loss we are put to for an Antecedent to the Relative, *They*. The only one that I can meet with is, *publick declarations of the Divine will touching mans duty*, p. 66. and *Divine Edicts*, p. 67. and I cannot fathom the reason of the denial of their necessity to their two ends by himself assigned, *Mans Obedience, and the Decorum of the Divine Government*; at least if he means by them the *Gospel*, (as I gather from his after-discourse.) If he intends by his Relative *They*, *determinative influences to holy actions, to which the nature of man is now viciously inclined*, (as he elsewhere speaks, *Post.* p. 40, & 35, compar'd) I cannot find that *Antecedent* in his whole Discourse foregoing: yet the following passages might give a suspicious person some ground to pitch upon this latter for Mr. *H*'s meaning. *And thus* [*by messengers running from Nation to Nation, some to communicate, others to inquire after the tydings of the Gospel*] *how easily, and even naturally would the Gospel soon have spread it self through the world?* Let. p. 69. I confess that term *naturally* will not down with me: for I have always seen cause to own Dr. *Sibs*'s weighty observation, *in his Souls Conflict, That though there*

there are seeds of the Law, yet there are none of the Gospel in man by nature. But upon second thoughts to do Mr. *H.* all the right I can, out of love to his person, and the truth, I find, That the *They* refers to *the Divine Edicts of the Gospel, which he supposes not needful to be immediately by the Ministry; but the transmission of it from those that have heard it published by them, may suffice to others.* But to what end he expatiates upon this I do not know; though I do what ill use Mr. *John Goodwin* in his *Pagans debt and dowry*, makes of this very notion. *Sed meliora spero.*

4. *Nor was it incongruous that God should provide by some extraordinary means that his gracious tenders might not finally be rejected by all.* Let. p. 74.

Rep. Yet it seems not of such absolute necessity (as I always conceived it to be) *if by the dispensations of God towards the whole community of mankind,* [whereof he reckons instances, and addes] *they might understand God to have favourable propensions towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy; and might by his goodness be led to repentance.* Let. p. 75, 77, compar'd. For thus Mr. *John Goodwin* argues against the absolute necessity of the Gospel strictly taken. And in Phrases so near, that my fancy is ready

ready to abuſe me with a miſtake, that not *J. H.* but *J. G.* is now diſcourſing. *Rom.* 2. 4, *The long-ſuffering of God and goodneſs of God are ſaid to lead men to Repentance, becauſe they teſtifie according to a rational and clear interpretation, a willingneſs and readineſs in God to receive all ſuch into grace and favour with himſelf, who ſhall unfeignedly repent of their ſins.* So Mr. *Goodwin*, Pagans debt and dowry, *pag.* 13. And he adds, *There is no other conſideration but this, (at leaſt none without this) in reſpect whereof the patience and bountifulneſs of God can be ſaid to lead,* i. e. *to perſwade or invite to repentance. There is no motive or perſwaſive, whereof ſinners are capable unto repentance, without hope of pardon upon repentance.* Id. Ib. *And concludes you ſee it clear from the Scripture, that even Heathen men, and thoſe that want the Hiſtory of the Goſpel have yet a ſufficiency of means whereby to believe, and ſo to prevent the wrath and indignation which is to come.* Mr. *Goodwin*, Ib. p. 14. I muſt profeſs I am none of Mr. *J. G*'s Proſelytes, who ever be; nor was Mr. *Obadiah Howe*, a moſt worthy perſon, and kinſman of our Learned Antagoniſt, who hath learnedly and largely confuted him, in a Tract intituled ſignificantly, *The Pagan Preacher ſilenced*, out of whom I ſhall tranſcribe his Anſwer to Mr. *J. G*'s Explication of *Rom.* 2. 4.

2. 4. of Heathens. *This second Chapter relates to the* Jews, *whom he reprehends because by their Law they would condemn the Gentiles as sinners, when they committed the same things. But that the patience* [*and goodness of God*] *afforded to the* Jews *was without the word, I think* Mr. G. *will not affirm, which is the cause why the Apostle concludes the* Jews *under a great inexcusability, because the ministry of the word superadded to the light of nature, became not efficacious to restrain them from sin; and from this very Argument he argues against the Jews,* v. 17, 18. *still supposing that these persons enjoying the patience of God,* v. 4. *had the letter of the Gospel.* So far Mr. *Ob. Howe,* p. 52.

5. *As to those with whom Gods Methods succeed not well, it is to be considered, that he doth not apply himself to every (or to any person) immediately, and severally, after some such tenour of speech as this; I know thee to be a profligate, hopeless wretch, and that thou wilt finally disregard whatsoever I say to thee, and consequently perish, and become miserable. But however (though I foresee most certainly thou wilt not, yet I entreat thee to hear and obey, and live.* Let. p. 79. And afterwards, *What is endeavoured for the reducement of such——is by substituted Ministers, that know no more of the event than they do themselves,* p. 81.

Rep.

Rep. Nor doth God apply himſelf to ſinners in ſuch a tenour of ſpeech with reference to Predetermination of thoſe natural actions; which becauſe ſuch need a cauſe acting efficiently for the production of them: though he knows (without ſpecial grace which to them he affords not) a moral obliquity will adhere to them. And it is as true, that what God does for the reducement of them is by Miniſters, who know as little who are Predetermined to good, and who to ſinful actions, as the Saints or Sinners ſo Predetermined.

Having diſcourſed thus more laxely, Mr. *H.* proceeds to a more ſtrict diſquiſition of two things.

1. *What may be alledged out of Gods word in reference to them that finally periſh in their wickedneſs, which can be thought not conſiſtent with ſincerity to have inſerted, upon the ſuppoſed foreſight of ſo diſmal an iſſue?* Let. p. 82. *And he inſtances in Gods profeſſing to will the ſalvation of all,* 1 Tim. 2. 4, *Not to deſire the death of him that dieth,* Ezek. 18. 32; *Yea, and profeſſeth himſelf grieved that any periſh,* Pſalm 81. 12, 13. Ib.

In anſwer to which Scripture in general (beſides many things ſaid well): he ſays, *That which Gods declarations do amount unto is,* &c. *That if they neglect to attend to theſe*

these external discoveries of the word, &c. they are not to expect he should over-power them by a strong hand, and save them against the continual disinclination of their own wills. p. 89, 90.

Reply. I am not able to make sense of the last words: For I understand not what overcoming by a strong hand (in a sinners case) God can make use of, that leaves the will under disinclination to salvation; And they seem to be repugnant to another Clause referring to the same persons: *that they cannot promise themselves such power shall be used with them, as shall finally overcome their averse disaffected hearts.* p. 90.

2. Mr. *H.* adds, *Whatsover extraordinary Acts, God may do upon some to make them willing.* p. 90.

Reply. I am not well satisfied (because I am not ignorant of the *Arminians* apprehension about *Pauls* Conversion) that Mr. *H.* calls those Acts by which God makes some men willing, *extraordinary:* for though they are *supernatural*, yet they are *ordinary* to all that are willing. It seems to imply, that some are made willing by *ordinary* acts, and others by *extraordinary:* And so it is an ill-sounding word.

3. Mr. *H.* at last gives us the import of the above-cited Scripture, That they *really signifie the obedience and blessedness of*

of those his Creatures that are capable thereof, to be more pleasing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they should disobey and perish, which is the utmost can be meant [*particularly*] *by those words, God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledg of the truth.* p. 93, 94.

Reply. As these words sound they do not gratify my ear: For I cannot understand, that the Connexion of Disobedience and Destruction, should not be as agreeable to Gods Will and Nature, as the Connexion of Obedience and Salvation. I take the import of 2 *Cor.* 2. 15, *We* [Apostles] *are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish:* that God takes pleasure in the perishing of unbelievers, as well as in the saving of believers.

2. Yet *in sano sensu*, I admit them as the most learned and pious *Davenant, sometime Bishop of Salisbury*, explains the matter: *When God commandeth any thing which is good, he unfeignedly liketh and loveth such actions, and can do no other; his own natural goodness, and holiness terminating,* Voluntatem divinæ complacentiæ [i. e. *the will of divine Complacence*] *unto all holy actions by whomsoever performed,* Animadv. *on* Hoard, p. 350. *And Gods meaning when he offereth any grace to men, is, that they should perform such actions whereunto such grace*

grace conduceth; and his meaning when he promiseth glory to any man if he believeth and perseveres, is truly to perform it if he do so. Id. pag. 353. And not to sever the learned Bishops sentiments: To Mr. *Hoards* notion [the same with Mr. *Howes*], that *mercy is more natural and pleasing to God than Vindicative Justice, which is his strange work; He doth not willingly afflict*, &c. [for which are quoted, *Mich.* 7. 18. *Isa.* 28. 21. *Lam.* 3. 33]. The Bishop replyes, *That is said to be natural and pleasing to God, which comes originally from himself, and is not an act depending upon the misdeserts of the Creature.* p. 206. *As for Vindicative Justice it may be called a strange work, because it is* opus occasionatum [i. e. *a work occasioned*] *by mans transgression.* p. 287.

And once more to cite this eminent Divine; *The absolute liberty and supreme dominion, which God hath in the preparing, or not preparing of effectual grace, wherein the absolute decrees of Election and non-Election do shew themselves, is a thing as natural and pleasing to God as his mercy.* p. 287.

4. Mr. *H.* asserts, *That God doth so far really will the salvation of all, as not to omit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themselves, but not so as to effect it by that extraordinary exertion of power, which he thinks fit to employ upon some others.* Let. p. 105. *Reply.*

Reply. This muſt be mixed with a grain of ſalt: If this omiſſion of Gods refer only to the uſe of means for effecting mens ſalvation, we grant, that *in genere mediorum*, God is not wanting to them that live under the Goſpel-diſpenſations. And in this ſenſe God repreſenting himſelf under the ſimilitude of an Husbandman, truly ſays of *Iſrael, What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Iſa.* 5. 4. But if Mr. *H.* intends (as the words ſeem to ſound) that ſalvation may be obtained by the uſe of means, without that exertion of power (which he calls *extraordinary*) whereby that end is obtained in ſome, I cannot take ſuch an aſſertion upon his bare word. I have been taught from my Childhood (and ſee no cauſe to ſuſpect the credulity of that age abuſed to draw me into a misbelief) that ſuch an exertion of power, as whereby God raiſed Chriſt from the dead, is univerſally neceſſary to make the means of ſalvation effectual to their end.

5. Mr. *H.* profeſſes his diſlike of the common diſtinction of *Voluntas beneplaciti & ſigni, in this preſent caſe* [viz. *to explain how God wills the ſalvation of all, and yet only of ſome*] *under which ſuch as cavned, and thoſe that have much uſed it, have only rather I doubt not, conceal'd a good meaning*

than expreſſed by it a bad one. p. 106.

Reply. And whoever coined it (which I take it was *Hugo de S. Victore*) few of our Divines but have uſed it, that have dealt in any Controverſie which gave an occaſion for it. And why ſhould Mr. *H.* charge them with a concealment of a good meaning, which they have ſo often diſcovered? If Mr. *H.* only diſlkes the terms, I ſhould not contend with him, for I can give him their ſenſe in others from the learned *Davenant*; *The will of God termed* voluntas ſimplicis complacentiæ, *i. e. the will of ſimple complacency* [*which is the ſame with* vol. ſigni] *and that which is termed* voluntas abſoluta *or* efficax *i. e. an abſolute or efficacious will* [*which is the ſame with* vol. beneplaciti] *may well ſtand together. God wills that all men believe and be ſaved with the will of complacence; God wills and decrees to permit that ſome continue in unbelief, and be not ſaved but periſh, with the Abſolute will. The former will in effect is but a conditional will; As if the Apoſtle had ſaid, God will have all men to be ſaved, if all men ſhall believe in Chriſt; and to believe in Chriſt is an act ſo well pleaſing and ſo agreeable unto Gods will, that whereſoever it is found it ſhall be rewarded. But notwithſtanding the extent of this will unto all men, there is in God an abſolute will of permitting ſome to continue in their unbelief,*

and

and ſo periſh, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 220.

But it muſt be obſerved, that whereas the moſt learned Biſhop ſeems to attribute a *Conditional will to God* above; he afterwards explains himſelf, *Meer or purely conditional Decrees* agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature. The ſpeeches therefore cited out of Scripture [*He that believes ſhall be ſaved, &c.*] do not imply a Conditional Will in God ſuſpended for any moment of time, and then *poſt purificatam conditionem*, i. e. after the Condition performed] becoming an abſolute and effectual will, *&c.* But theſe conditional Decrees are grounded on ſome abſolute revealed Decree of God, to the Performance whereof he hath tied himſelf. For example, it is an abſolute Decree of the Divine Will publiſhed in the Goſpel, *that whoſoever believeth*, &c. ſhall be ſaved. From hence is derived that mixt conditional Decree; If *Cain*, *Judas*, or any other believe, they ſhall be ſaved. Now ſuch mixt conditional Decrees carry no contradiction to the abſolute, *&c.* who ſeeth not theſe Propoſitions may well ſtand together? I will that if *Judas* repent and believe, he ſhall have remiſſion and ſalvation. I will not to give to *Judas* the gift of repentance, of faith and of eternal life, *Id.* p. 225, 226, 227. I have ſaid enough to obviate M. *H*'s exagitation of the terms *Vol.*

ſigni & beneplaciti, which are not worth the trouble of tranſcribing.

6. But M. *H.* adds, *And of theſe faults the application of the diſtinction of Gods ſecret and revealed Will unto this caſe, though it be uſeful in many, is as guilty.* Let. p. 108.

Rep. 1. As to this I ſay (as the aforeſaid Biſhop *Davenant* of M. *Hoard*); Mr. *H.* ſhould firſt have rightly ſet it down, and then have tried his ſtrength in confuting it, and I ſhall add his explication of it: We ſay that there is in God a true will revealed in the Goſpel of ſaving all men that ſhall believe; and a true will liking, embracing, rewarding faith, holineſs, perſeverance in all men whomſoever without diſtinction of perſons: And this is the Will call'd *Voluntas ſimplicis complacentiæ* [or *ſigni*] which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not being of ſuch good acts in this or that ſingular perſon. This Will we know, and therefore we call it his *revealed will*. There is alſo in God a ſecret will of bringing ſome men to faith, perſeverance, and the Kingdom of heaven, and of not bringing others to any of theſe: this Will we know not, and therefore we call it, the *ſecret Will*, *Dav. ag. Hoard*, p. 221: only 'tis to be noted, that when the Reverend Biſhop ſays, *This ſecret will of God we know not*; it muſt be underſtood

derſtood, with reference to the particular perſons whom God intends to work faith, &c. in; for we know in general, that there are ſome perſons whom God will be thus good unto. I add this to prevent a Cavil, which may ſeem very acute to them that uſe it: If God's will of good pleaſure [or abſolute will] be ſecret, how come we to know it? or if it be revealed, how is it ſecret? *And then the members of the diſtinction are confounded* (as Mr. *H.* objects, p. 107.) who ſhould have done well to have told us, in what caſes it is uſeful (though not in the preſent caſe). For I dare offer my ſelf to diſprove the uſe of it in any caſe, upon the ſame grounds that Mr. *H.* can the uſe of it in this.

Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. *H.* hath ſo ſolemnly declared his diſlike of our diſtinction, he owns it himſelf, but in other words, which are the explication of our terms: *And whereas it may be thought to follow hence, that hereby we aſcribe to God a liableneſs to fruſtration and diſappointment, that is without pretence: The reſolve of the Divine will in this matter* [viz. *the holineſs and ſalvation of all men*] *being not concerning the event what man ſhall do, but concerning his duty what he ſhould, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happineſs*, Let. p. 112.

Now to leave Mr. *H.* inexcuſable for the impertinency of his exception againſt our Diſtinction; let us ſee how Dr *Twiſſe* (*a man that much uſed this diſtinction*, and therefore blamed by Mr. *H.*) explains it. There is no contradiction, ſays he, between theſe two wills Divine: For *Voluntas ſigni* is improperly called a Will, for it ſignifies only *mans duty, or what he ſhould do*, as what will be pleaſing to God if it be done. But *Voluntas beneplaciti* is properly and ſimply a will, (*viz.* whereby is decreed whatſoever ſhall come to paſs, by Gods either efficiency, or permiſſion) *Twiſſe Vind. Gr. l.* 1. *p.* 1. ◊. 12. *p.* 140. It is evident to any intelligent Collator, that M. *H*'s and Dr. *Twiſſe*'s ſenſe is the ſame, and ſo Mr *H.* hath blamed himſelf in blaming *Twiſſe*.

7. *And if it ſhould be inſiſted, that in aſſerting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become mans duty, even where it is not done, we ſhall herein aſcribe to him, at leaſt an ineffectual and imperfect will, as that which doth not bring to paſs the thing willed: It is anſwer'd, that Imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine will, meerly for not effecting every thing whereto it may have a real propenſion*, Let. p. 115, 116.

Reply. We had need tread warily here, for our way is ſtrewed with Daggers, I mean, with terms repugnant to each other. 1. If

1. If God be understood but to *will mans duty, not the event* [his obedience to it] there's no colour for the Objection, that the will of God is ineffectual; for it is effectual (when declared) to make mans duty what it pleases.

2. If by *willing mans duty*, he means *the event* [the performance of it], then is there an Objection indeed, but without solution, and not capable of any.

3. Take it how you will, there's no answer to the Objection. For this is, *That Gods will is ineffectual if that come not to pass which is willed:* and that is, That *God hath no will at all of that which comes not to pass* [which yet the Objection supposes] for what else is the meaning of a real *Propension*, which differs as much from willing as an habit from an act, or as the power of seeing when my eyes are shut, from my actual seeing when they are open?

8. *Nor could any course have been taken that was fit in himself, and more agreeable to sincerity* [viz. *than counsels, and exhortations, and whatsoever means God uses to prevent mens sins*]. *There are only two ways to be thought on besides, either that God should wholly have forborn to make overtures to man in common, or that he should efficaciously have overpowr'd all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon sober con-*

ſideration both of theſe will be judged altogether unfit, Let. p. 121.

Reply. As to the *former* of theſe two ways, I have nothing to oppoſe; As to the *Latter*, there is a great deal of doubt; and Mr. *H.* implies ſo much when he ſays, *it is leſs obvious.*

9. Mr. *Howe* proceeds to ſhew the unfitneſs of Gods efficacious overpowring all men into a compliance with his Overtures to them, becauſe of two congruities in the courſe taken for the Government of the World.

1. *That it be ſteady and uniform; not interrupted by frequent, extraordinary and anomalous actions.*

2. *That he uſe a royal Liberty, of ſtepping out of his uſual courſe ſometimes, as he ſees meet*, p. 131, 132; and adds, *If we apply them to the affairs of Grace, there is ſomething correſpondent. That ordinarily* [grace] *be ſought and expected, in the uſe of ordinary means. And that ſometimes its Sovereignty ſhew it ſelf in preventive exertions; and in working ſo Heroically, as none have beforehand, in the neglect of its ordinary methods, any reaſon to expect*, p. 138.

Repl. 1. This Anſwer is not fitted to the Queſtion. The Queſtion is, *Whether it be fitting for God efficaciouſly to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes*

to

to them in common? The Answer is, *It is not fit for God to overpower men, without making any overtures to them at all:* or to alter the terms and keep the sense, the Question is, *Whether it be fitting, that God should give all men special grace, in the use of means?* And the Answer is, It is not fitting, that God should give all men special grace, without the use of means. An admirable incogitancy in a man of parts. If the Question had been about the fitness of Gods converting all men (whom he thinks meet to convert) as he did *Saul*, by a voice from Heaven; the Answer had been a-kin to the Question: (though even *Saul* was not converted without means, but without ordinary means).

2. I am at a loss for a Reason, why it should be unfit for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the means (supposing what I hope Mr. *H.* will not deny, I am sure will never be able to disprove; that no man will ever comply with the means, that is not overpowr'd thereunto) unless it be this, that it is unfit for God to bestow grace, and salvation upon all men (which would be a very hard saying).

Reply. 2. As to his second *Thesis*, if it be (as 'tis pretended) an Answer to the Question proposed. I Answer, That though it

it be fitting enough for God to *uſe a Royal liberty* in giving grace to ſome, and not to others; yet I underſtand not that the ſuſpenſion of his Liberty, and binding up himſelf to give grace to all, had been any way unfit. We poor Mortals, I am certain, are very unfit to judg what is fit or unfit for God to do. We may reſt ſatisfied that God does nothing but what becomes him: but we ſhall intermeddle in things too high for us, if we paſs ſentence, that for God to do otherwiſe in many inſtances than he hath done, would unbecome him. God hath permitted the whole race of mankind to turn Rebels to his Soveraign Majeſty, and but ſome part of the Angelical nature. This became him to do, becauſe he hath done it. But ſuppoſe he had prevented the Rebellion of all his rational Creatures; or mans, and not the Angels; or the Angels, and not mans; or permitted the Rebellion of all the Angels, (as he hath of all mankind); or reſtored the Angels, and left man in his own ruins: would Mr. *Howe* adventure to ſay, that *upon ſober conſideration any of theſe ways would have been judged altogether unfit for God to have taken?*

10. Mr. *How* proceeds, and acquaints us, *that it were incongruous that a whole order of Intelligent creatures ſhould be moved only by inward*

inward impulſes: —— *And that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral Government, ſhould be rendered to this purpoſe* [viz. the Improvement of means] *uſeleſs and vain. And that they ſhould be tempted to expect to be conſtantly managed as meer Machines, that know not their own uſe*, Let. pag. 142, 143.

Reply. Either this Harangue is impertinent, or it borders as near upon *Arminianiſm* as *Scotland* does upon *England*. If Mr. *H*'s meaning be, that it is incongruous for God to overpower men, that *neglect the means* [as his words *p.* 142, imply] whereas the Queſtion he undertook to Anſwer is, *Whether it be congruous for God to overpower all* (as he does ſome) *that uſe the means*, then his Diſcourſe is beſides the buſineſs; or if he would inſinuate, that *the courſe which God takes with ſome* [though not with all] *in overpowring them, is to manage them as Machines, and render their natural faculties vain and uſeleſs*; This is *Arminius*'s Charge upon the Proteſtant Doctrines of the *irreſiſtible operation of ſpecial grace.*

To draw now to a cloſe, after too long a Diſcourſe, (that I may not tire my Reader) I ſhall only requeſt him, that he would duly conſider, that of Mr. *H*'s Principles there are theſe deſperate conſequences, (which I have ſo much charity as to believe he does

not

not ſee, and (ſo) nor own,) That God is juſtled out of his proper place; I mean, of being the firſt cauſe of all the Creatures actions, and the Creature put in his ſtead, as being repreſented able to uſe its powers, as it pleaſes. That one great Perfection of the Divine Nature, *viz.* Foreknowledg of future Contingencies, is ſeparated from it, by denying the only true ground of ſuch Foreknowledg, the Divine Decrees. And hence, the Providence of God in governing the actions of his Creatures is left in great danger of falling, becauſe a Superſtructure raiſed without a foundation. For how can God govern thoſe actions which depend not immediately upon him in their production; nor are foreknown in his *Eternal Decree*, wherein lies the model of all he intends to exerciſe his Government upon, *in time*?

In ſum, his Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheiſm, and deſerves as ſharp a cenſure as one gave of *Epicurus*'s denial of Providence, *Verbis Deum poſuit, re ſuſtulit*; i.e. *He acknowledged God in words, but denied him in deed.* For as all Arguments proving any of the *Divine Attributes*, do prove a *God*, becauſe *thoſe terms are eſſentially convertible*: ſo thoſe Arguments which deny any *Divine Attributes*, do alſo deny a *God* upon the ſame ground.

I ſhall give the Reader no further trouble

trouble but what (if he be conſcientious) he will willingly give himſelf of examining what he hath read, and judging according to the evidence of *Truth*; for which in this momentous Controverſie, and not for *victory* I have entred into this publick conteſt with my ancient and learned Friend, Mr. *Howe*, which I take to be ſufficiently warranted by that paſſage of holy Writ: *But when Peter was come to Antioch I withſtood him to the face, becauſe he was to be blamed*, Gal. 2. 11. Whence it may be duly collected, that the reverence or eſtimation of any mans perſon ought not to hinder a publick reproof, when he is guilty of a publick ſcandal.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Epiſt. P.4. l.9. r. efforts. l.14. r. an. p.6. l.*ult.* r. you. p.7. l.21. r. lapt. l.29. r. efforts.

Book, p.3. l.30. r. in theſe terms. p.4. blot out the three firſt lines, and an half. p.13. l.1. r. *materiale*. p.20. l.3. after impeded r. 2*ly*. p.22. l.3. for 3. r. 2. p.58. l.26. for word r. work. p.73. l.28. after is r. true. p.87. l.26. r. reverend.